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PROSECUTORIAL REGULATION VERSUS  
PROSECUTORIAL ACCOUNTABILITY 
STEPHANOS BIBAS†
No government official has as much unreviewable power or discretion as the 
prosecutor.  Few regulations bind or even guide prosecutorial discretion, and 
fewer still work well.  Most commentators favor more external regulation by legis-
latures, judges, or bar authorities.  Neither across-the-board legislation nor ex post 
review of individual cases has proven to be effective, however.  Drawing on man-
agement literature, this Article reframes the issue as a principal-agent problem 
and suggests corporate strategies for better serving the relevant stakeholders.  Fear 
of voters could better check prosecutors, as could victim participation in individ-
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ual cases.  Scholars have largely neglected the most promising avenue of reform, 
namely changing the internal structure and management of prosecutors’ offices.  
Leaders could do more to develop office cultures, norms, and ideals that value 
more than maximizing conviction statistics.  Hierarchical office structures and 
internal procedural and substantive office policies could promote deliberation, 
give fair notice, and increase consistency.  Hiring, training, promotion, and ten-
ure practices could better shape prosecutors and their behavior.  Pay structures 
and feedback from judges, defense counsel, and victims could encourage good be-
havior.  Finally, publishing more data on charges, convictions, plea bargains, 
and sentences could also improve accountability. 
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................960
I. INSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS ...........................964
A. Legislatures’ Responses ..........................................................965
B. Judges’ Review of Criminal Cases ...........................................969
C. Bar Authorities’ Rules and Discipline.....................................975
II. EXTERNAL PRESSURE BY STAKEHOLDERS .......................................979
A. Informing and Empowering the General Public .......................983
B. Informing Victims and Letting Them Participate ....................991
C. Giving Defendants Appropriate Voice .....................................994
III. INTERNAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS..........................................996
A. Prosecutorial Office Culture ...................................................997
B. The Structure of Prosecutors’ Offices .....................................1000
C. Prosecutors’ Internal Office Policies ......................................1003
D. Personnel Actions:  Hiring, Firing, Promotion, Training ......1007
E. Information, Evaluations, and Incentives ............................1011
CONCLUSION........................................................................................1015
INTRODUCTION
No government official in America has as much unreviewable 
power and discretion as the prosecutor.  Legislators are checked by 
other legislators, the executive’s veto, judicial review, and voters.  Gov-
ernors and the President are limited by legislation, legislative funding 
decisions, judicial review, and voters.  Judges face appellate review by 
multiple layers of courts, and some face reelection.  Administrative 
agencies are constrained by judicial review and laws such as the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act1 and Government in the Sunshine Act.2
1 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–
559, 701–706 (2006)). 
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Few of these forces meaningfully constrain prosecutors.  They fol-
low no Administrative Procedure Act, nor do they operate in the sun-
shine of public disclosure.  While in theory the separation of powers 
should check prosecutors, in practice it does not.3  Legislatures keep 
giving prosecutors more power, not less, by expanding overlapping 
criminal statutes and giving prosecutors more plea-bargaining tools.4
Judges largely avoid interfering with prosecutorial decisions.  They 
reason that juries will ultimately check charges, even though few cases 
make it to jury trials in a world of guilty pleas.  Governors and Presi-
dents exercise little or no control over line prosecutors’ decisions. 
In theory, prosecutors are beholden to the public interest or jus-
tice.  These concepts, however, are so diffuse and elastic that they do 
not constrain prosecutors much, certainly not in the way that an iden-
tifiable client would.  As I have argued elsewhere, prosecution is a low-
visibility process about which the public has poor information and lit-
tle right to participate.5  District attorneys’ electoral contests are rarely 
measured assessments of a prosecutor’s overall performance.  At best, 
campaign issues boil down to boasts about conviction rates, a few 
high-profile cases, and maybe a scandal.  The advantages of incum-
bency and name recognition are also huge.  Moreover, a district at-
torney’s subordinates are unelected and often operate with remarka-
bly little oversight. 
The resulting dangers can be enormous.  While prosecutorial dis-
cretion is “at the heart of the State’s criminal justice system,” prosecu-
tors’ “power to be lenient [also] is the power to discriminate.”6  Prose-
cutors have great leeway to abuse their powers and indulge their self-
interests, biases, or arbitrariness.  As I have argued elsewhere, prose-
cutors have personal and sometimes financial incentives to lighten 
2 Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552b). 
3 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV.
989, 993 (2006) (“[T]he government faces almost no institutional checks when it pro-
ceeds in criminal matters.”). 
4 William Stuntz has explored this theme in many of his works.  See, e.g., William J. 
Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529-57 (2001) 
[hereinafter Stuntz, Pathological Politics]; William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Be-
tween Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 55-59 (1997) (noting that 
legislatures get around problems of proving crimes by creating new crimes that apply 
more broadly and are easier to prove). 
5 See Stephanos Bibas, Essay, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 923-31 (2006). 
6 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297, 312 (1987) (quoting KENNETH CULP 
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 170 (1969)). 
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their own workloads.7  They are tempted to try a few strong or high-
profile cases to gain marketable experience while striking hurried 
plea bargains in most other cases.  They may be extremely risk-averse 
to protect their win-loss records, which further their employment 
prospects and political ambitions.8  Thus, they may press their own 
agendas at the expense of victims and the public.9
The potential for abuse of discretion calls for more effective 
mechanisms to oversee and regulate prosecutors’ conduct.  Many, if 
not most, other government actors enjoy less power yet are subject to 
far more regulation than prosecutors are.  The comparison suggests 
that prosecutors are the outliers and that some new regulatory 
mechanisms are likely to be worth the cost.10
While many scholars discuss prosecutorial discretion as a problem, 
most favor external regulation of prosecutors by other institutions.  
One strand of this scholarship, exemplified by James Vorenberg’s 
work, favors legislation to restrict prosecutorial discretion ex ante.11
Another strand endorses ex post review by judges and bar authorities 
of individual cases of prosecutorial misconduct.12  Unfortunately, 
these external, institutional controls have proven to be ineffective.  
Legislation is too crude, and ex post review of individual cases is too 
narrow, to attack the deeper, systemic problems with patterns of 
prosecutorial discretion. 
7 See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV.
2463, 2471 (2004). 
8 Id. at 2470-72. 
9 There certainly may be other problems with the criminal justice system, such as 
many observers’ sense that it is too harsh across the board.  Because this harshness is 
primarily a matter of legislative policy, rather than prosecutorial discretion in appor-
tioning punishment among cases, I will not focus on it here. 
10 For more extended treatments of the problem of unregulated prosecutorial dis-
cretion, see DAVIS, supra note 6, at 166-72; Bibas, supra note 5; James Vorenberg, Decent 
Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1545-60 (1981). 
11 See Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1567; see also Arnold I. Burns et al., Curbing
Prosecutorial Excess:  A Job for the Courts & Congress, CHAMPION, July 1998, at 12, 63 (dis-
cussing legislation to increase oversight of prosecutors). 
12 See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 180-83 (2007) (emphasizing the need for stronger bar disciplinary proc-
esses); DAVIS, supra note 6, at 209-12 (suggesting judicial review of prosecutors’ deci-
sions to charge or not to charge in individual cases); Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary 
Sanctions Against Prosecutors for Brady Violations:  A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693, 733-
42 (1987) (proposing substantive and procedural changes for bar disciplinary proceed-
ings); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1568-72 (endorsing broader judicial review of 
prosecutors’ charging and plea-bargaining decisions in individual cases). 
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Instead of looking to external solutions, we should reconceptual-
ize the problem.  Prosecutors are agents who imperfectly serve their 
principals (the public) and other stakeholders (such as victims and 
defendants).13  This agency-cost problem resembles corporate em-
ployees’ temptation to shirk or serve their self-interests at the expense 
of shareholders, customers, competitors, and other stakeholders.  This 
lens suggests alternatives to external, institutional solutions.  Some in-
volve giving voters, victims, and defendants more direct influence and 
providing them with the information that they need to monitor 
prosecutors’ decisions.  Another group of solutions draws on man-
agement literature to suggest ways to transform an office’s structure, 
incentives, and culture from the inside.  In short, institutional design 
is more promising than rigid legal regulation.  Simply commanding 
ethical, consistent behavior is far less effective than creating an envi-
ronment that hires for, inculcates, expects, and rewards ethics and 
consistency. 
I have previously analyzed how opacity and insularity allow prose-
cutors to avoid serving victims and the public faithfully.14  This Article 
discusses possible solutions to that problem, exploring checks that do 
or could regulate prosecutors or hold them accountable.  Part I be-
gins with external rules.  Many commentators have argued that legisla-
tures, judges, or bar authorities can and should regulate prosecutors 
more vigorously.  Neither across-the-board legislation nor case-by-case 
review ex post, however, is well suited to address systemic concerns 
about prosecutorial discretion. 
The remainder of the Article reframes the issue as a principal-
agent problem that requires a two-step solution.  The first step is to 
use pressure from principals to align the interests of the top agents 
(head prosecutors) with principals’ own interests.  Thus, Part II turns 
to external control by stakeholders.  It holds out moderately more 
hope for giving voters, victims, and defendants better information and 
13 These categories simplify messy realities.  One can treat the public at large, the 
voting public, or subsets such as particular communities or neighborhoods as princi-
pals.  Likewise, other stakeholders include not only direct victims of crimes and defen-
dants, but also their families and friends, bystanders, and other local residents affected 
by or fearful of particular crimes.  While the interests of these groups doubtless vary, 
they also have much in common.  For the sake of simplicity and analytical clarity, I will 
focus on the categories of victims, defendants, and the public, without further differ-
entiating ways in which subunits of these categories may vary in their interests and per-
spectives. See infra note 83 and accompanying text. 
14 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 933-46. 
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greater rights to participate.  While these remedies are not panaceas, 
they are moderately promising ways to influence head prosecutors. 
The second step is for top agents to align their subagents’ inter-
ests with those of the principals, much as corporate managers moti-
vate subordinates to serve customers and shareholders.  In this vein, 
Part III considers internal structures, cultures, and incentives that 
prosecutors’ offices could use to regulate themselves and finds them 
most promising.  Leadership by head prosecutors could do more to 
create and shape office culture, values, norms, and ideals.  Hierarchi-
cal office structure can promote internal consistency and make possi-
ble more procedural and substantive oversight.  Prosecutors’ offices 
should promulgate and publish more procedural guidelines to struc-
ture their internal review of cases.  Internal substantive guidelines 
could harmonize prosecutors’ substantive results.  Office structure, 
recruitment, hiring, training, promotion, and tenure policies could 
do more to shape office culture.  Pay structures and incentives could 
induce prosecutors to pursue goals beyond their own win-loss records.  
Finally, prosecutors could garner and use feedback from other prose-
cutors, judges, defense counsel, jurors, victims, and maybe the public.  
This Article concludes that voters, victims, defendants, and head 
prosecutors should do far more to encourage good behavior, guide 
prosecutorial discretion, and make the entire process more transpar-
ent and consistent. 
I. INSTITUTIONAL REGULATION OF PROSECUTORS
The few scholars who have focused on prosecutorial discretion as 
a problem have largely favored external, institutional regulation of 
prosecutors’ offices.  As this Part argues, that strategy is unlikely to 
succeed.  Other scholars have previously noted isolated difficulties 
with implementing legislative, judicial, or bar regulation of prosecu-
tors.  Hardly any, however, have drawn broader conclusions about the 
merits of external versus internal controls.15  The moral of the story is 
that institutionalized regulations are inherently blunt weapons, too 
crude and too sporadic to constrain prosecutors. 
Section A critiques proposals for legislation to rein in prosecutors.  
Legislators collude to maximize prosecutorial bargaining freedom 
and are not about to rein it in.  Legislative oversight hearings, how-
15 One notable exception is Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining 
Tradeoff, 55 STAN. L. REV. 29, 53 & n.84 (2002), though that brief discussion asserted 
that external controls do not work without really explaining why. 
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ever, are perhaps more promising.  Section B turns to judicial review 
and finds it ineffective in shaping prosecutors’ behavior.  Judges are 
complicit in prosecutors’ plea bargaining.  Moreover, their case-by-
case review is poorly suited to policing broader, systemic concerns 
such as equality across cases, prosecutors, and jurisdictions.  For simi-
lar reasons, Section C contends that bar authorities do not and cannot 
check prosecutors effectively.  Simply calling for tougher enforcement 
of ethics rules will not help, as ex post, case-by-case review is not 
adapted to harmonize and change ingrained patterns of discretion. 
A.  Legislatures’ Responses 
The most natural response to a problem may be to exclaim that 
there ought to be a law against it.  In that vein, legislation sometimes 
tries to cabin and constrain prosecutorial discretion.  Albert Alschuler 
and Stephen Schulhofer, for example, recommend legislation to abol-
ish plea bargaining or specify fixed plea discounts.16  Several jurisdic-
tions have heeded this call, enacting laws that ban plea bargaining or 
limit its scope or discounts.17  James Vorenberg, and more recently 
Daniel Richman and William Stuntz, call for legislatures to revise 
criminal codes to narrow offense definitions.  Richman and Stuntz 
emphasize that code reform would foster oversight by voters and legis-
lators, while Vorenberg stresses that better definitions of crimes and 
punishments would reduce prosecutorial power over sentencing.18
16 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50, 52, 105-12 (1968) (arguing that plea bargaining should be abolished, in part 
because prosecutors are poor guardians of the public interest and have strong tempta-
tions to serve their self-interests); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 
YALE L.J. 1979, 2003-08 (1992) (proposing the abolition of plea bargaining, or at least 
fixed plea discounts in order to increase deterrence and avoid unfairness to defen-
dants and harm to innocent defendants); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1560-61 (pro-
posing that, if legislatures cannot abolish plea bargaining, they should at least peg dis-
counts at ten or twenty percent). 
17 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2004) (banning plea bargaining in all 
cases where indictment or information charges specified serious crimes); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAW § 220.10 (McKinney Supp. 2008) (greatly restricting prosecutors’ ability to 
plea bargain around mandatory drug sentences); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2005) (specifying fixed sentencing reductions of two to three offense 
levels as a reward for acceptance of responsibility). 
18 See Daniel C. Richman & William J. Stuntz, Essay, Al Capone’s Revenge:  An Essay 
on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 630-31 (2005) 
(suggesting that criminal-code reform would help voters and legislators to assess 
prosecutors’ performance); Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1567-68 (arguing that crimi-
nal-code revision could reduce prosecutorial discretion by specifying punishments 
more precisely). 
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Vorenberg also advocates that prosecutors report annually on their 
discretionary decisions to legislative committees in order to foster 
oversight.19
As Stuntz’s other work shows, however, hoping for legislatures to 
rein in prosecutorial discretion is a pipe dream.  Legislatures have 
strong incentives to give prosecutors freedom and tools to maximize 
convictions and minimize costs.  For example, legislatures broaden 
criminal liability, pass overlapping statutes, and raise punishments to 
give prosecutors extra plea-bargaining chips.  By doing so, they drive 
down the cost and increase the certainty and expected value of each 
conviction.  Prosecutors can thus convict more defendants and pro-
cure longer sentences for the same amount of time and money.  This 
increase in efficiency serves legislators’ interest in being tough on 
crime and prosecutors’ interest in maximizing convictions while 
minimizing workloads.20  In other words, legislatures’ and prosecutors’ 
interests are fundamentally aligned most of the time.  Prosecutors may 
occasionally be too zealous for legislatures’ tastes, but in those cases 
legislatures can shift blame to prosecutors.21  Legislatures occasionally 
tighten procedural rules in response to infamous prosecutorial 
abuses, particularly when the target of the abuse is a legislator.22  By 
and large, however, legislatures broaden prosecutorial power to bur-
nish their tough-on-crime credentials.  They lack incentives to regu-
late prosecutors systematically. 
For much the same reasons, legislatures are far more prone to 
wreck criminal codes than to improve them by recodifying them.  Leg-
islators gain political credit for responding to the crime du jour with a 
new crime or an increased penalty, even if the new crime is redun-
dant.23  And, as already mentioned, by doing so the legislature gives 
19 See Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1567. 
20 Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 4, at 528-39, 552. 
21 See id. at 548-49 (citing the example of Kenneth Starr’s investigation of Presi-
dent Clinton, which made the public angry at Starr but not at Congress). 
22 See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”:  Why Congress 
(Sometimes) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599.  For example, after 
the FBI’s Abscam sting operation targeted several United States Senators and Repre-
sentatives, legislation required special approval before the FBI could use informants in 
public-corruption cases or wiretap members of Congress.  Id. at 636-40.  After another 
FBI investigation failed to secure the conviction of Representative Joseph McDade for 
public corruption, McDade successfully sponsored a bill to apply state ethics rules to 
federal prosecutors.  Id. at 650-56. 
23 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson & Michael T. Cahill, The Accelerating Degradation of 
American Criminal Codes, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 633, 644 -45 (2005) [hereinafter Robinson & 
Cahill, Accelerating Degradation] (“Often, the drafters and enacters of a new provision do 
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prosecutors more bargaining chips and leverage.  Thus, the deteriora-
tion of criminal codes is accelerating, as amendments encrust codes 
like barnacles deforming a streamlined ship’s hull.24  While legisla-
tures have the power to rationalize criminal codes, they do not want to 
be accused of reducing the number of crimes on the books.  As a re-
sult, criminal-code reform has stalled at the federal level.25  Some 
states have reformed their codes in recent decades.  By and large, 
however, legislatures and prosecutors resist narrowing crimes, elimi-
nating redundant ones, and so destroying prosecutors’ plea-
bargaining chips.26
In short, legislative drafters posture to the public to seem tough 
on crime, yet they leave prosecutors the flexibility that they desire to 
strike bargains.27  More generally, as I have argued elsewhere, prosecu-
not know or especially care how it relates to the existing code, so amendments might 
overlap with the existing code while deviating from its form.”); Paul H. Robinson & Mi-
chael T. Cahill, Can a Model Penal Code Second Save the States from Themselves?, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 169, 170-72 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Cahill, Model Penal Code Second].
24 See Robinson & Cahill, Model Penal Code Second, supra note 23, at 172-73 (citing as 
an example Illinois, where in the 1990s the criminal code was amended twice as many 
times as it had been in the previous two decades). 
25 See Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform:  Past and Future, 2 BUFF. CRIM.
L. REV. 45, 111-52 (1998) (discussing past efforts to reform the federal criminal code 
and how they became mired in political battles, as well as the formidable barriers of 
inertia and self-interest to any comprehensive reform). 
26 While the Model Penal Code was the impetus to initial codification four dec-
ades ago, “most legislatures no longer use their criminal law codification power to 
promote broad and useful change, but have become ‘offense factories’ churning out 
more and more narrow, unnecessary, and often counterproductive new offenses . . . 
[b]ecause no elected legislative member can afford to appear ‘soft on crime.’”  Robin-
son & Cahill, Accelerating Degradation, supra note 23, at 634-35.  But see Darryl K. Brown, 
Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 234-40, 243-44 (2007) (noting that 
many states have abolished morals offenses and decriminalized some traffic violations 
and that some states have reduced drug sentences). 
27 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 939-40 (citing as an example mandatory-minimum 
sentencing laws, which legislatures pass to satisfy the public while, in effect, giving 
prosecutors more charging and plea-bargaining tools).  The incentives discussed above 
explain the fate of legislation that would appear to regulate prosecutors.  For example, 
in 1981 a California Senate bill would have banned plea bargaining in cases where the 
complaint, indictment, or information charged specified serious crimes.  The Califor-
nia District Attorneys Association actively opposed the bill, apparently contributing to 
its defeat.  When the proposed ban resurfaced as a ballot initiative the next year, the 
drafters appeased prosecutors by dropping any reference to complaints.  See CANDACE 
MCCOY, POLITICS AND PLEA BARGAINING: VICTIMS’ RIGHTS IN CALIFORNIA 30-31, 38 
(1993).  As a result, though the public thought that the initiative would ban plea bar-
gaining, it simply accelerated plea bargaining.  Prosecutors bargained over complaints 
filed in Municipal Court before filing indictments or informations in Superior Court.  
Id. at 37-38, 90-94, 118-24. 
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tors usually find ways to exploit ambiguities or loopholes in constrain-
ing legislation, invoke it selectively, or flout it outright.28  Ex ante laws 
are simply too crude, and too sporadically supervised and enforced by 
legislatures, to bind myriad secret prosecutorial decisions. 
Perhaps, as Vorenberg suggests, legislatures could hold aggressive 
oversight hearings to monitor prosecutorial behavior and require an-
nual summary reports.29  As a mechanism, oversight hearings are finer 
regulatory tools than legislation, and their ongoing or periodic nature 
is better designed to ensure compliance.  Committee staffers can de-
pose witnesses, subpoena documents, and collect statistics on prosecu-
torial decisions.30  Staffs, however, do not have many investigators or 
others equipped to engage in extensive field research.  Legislators can 
bring information to light through hearings, but grand jury secrecy 
and other rules may restrict disclosures to legislators.31  Legislators 
could still demand and review aggregate statistical reports and ques-
tion supervisory prosecutors about their policies.  And in a few high-
profile areas, from corporate crime to defrauding the government, 
legislatures have probed crimes themselves.32
Without full access to the underlying data, however, it is unclear 
whether oversight of prosecutors can be probing.  Also, there are few 
meaningful standards to which legislatures could hold prosecutors.  
More fundamentally, legislatures lack the interest and incentive to 
check prosecutors vigorously; they would rather be seen as prosecu-
tors’ allies in the fight on crime.  Though a prosecutorial scandal 
could conceivably change this dynamic, legislatures probably will not 
28 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 937-39, 943-45. 
29 See Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1567; see also Theodora Galacatos, Note, The
United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section:  A Case Study of Inter- and 
Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 658-59 (1995) (endorsing congressional monitoring of envi-
ronmental-crimes prosecution to guard against “undue partisan pressures”). 
30 See generally JOHN C. GRABOW, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 79-86, 176-82 
(1988); MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INVESTIGATIVE OVERSIGHT: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF CONGRESSIONAL INQUIRY 7-
10, 29-35 (1995). 
31 GRABOW, supra note 30, at 182-87; ROSENBERG, supra note 30, at 26-37. 
32 See, e.g., Philip Shenon, As New ‘Cop on the Beat,’ Congressman Starts Patrol, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2007, at A18 (reporting that the Chairman of the House Oversight and 
Government Reform Committee planned to investigate government contracting fraud 
in Iraq and the cleanup after Hurricane Katrina); see also Excerpts from the Senate Commit-
tee Hearing on the Collapse of Enron, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2002, at C8 (reporting senators’ 
expressions of anger directed at Kenneth Lay, the former CEO of Enron).  Note, how-
ever, that these oversight hearings have tended to focus on the crimes and criminals 
themselves, rather than on prosecutors’ patterns of investigation and prosecution. 
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oversee prosecutors vigorously any time soon.  At most, oversight 
might serve as a backstop or a piece of the solution, to ensure prose-
cutorial consistency with rules generated elsewhere.33  We do not know 
enough to be sure about this conclusion.  Further research would 
help to identify what circumstances prod legislatures to hold hearings 
and what lasting influence, if any, hearings can have on executive dis-
cretion.  My hunch, however, is that legislatures are unlikely to drive 
or catalyze change on their own. 
B. Judges’ Review of Criminal Cases 
Ex ante regulation by distant, politicized legislatures is too crude 
and easy to evade.  Perhaps, then, we need ex post supervision by apo-
litical judges who are already familiar with prosecutors and their cases.  
Many scholars have endorsed this approach.  For example, Vorenberg 
calls for more aggressive review of charges (at preliminary hearings) 
and plea bargains.34  Davis advocates meaningful judicial review of 
prosecutors’ decisions to prosecute or not.35  Other scholars have ad-
vocated more searching judicial review to promote equality and pre-
vent discrimination and arbitrariness.36
33 See Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines:  Balancing “Discretionary Justice,”
13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167, 198-200 (2004) (noting that the U.S. Senate Judici-
ary Committee has reviewed the failure of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to adhere to 
its own clemency guidelines, that the Office of Inspector General for the DOJ has re-
viewed the DOJ’s treatment of terrorism detainees, and that the General Accounting 
Office has reviewed the DOJ’s implementation of False Claims Act guidance). 
34 See Vorenberg, supra note 10, at 1568-72 (proposing that prosecutors should 
have to announce charging and plea-bargaining guidelines and that judges should re-
view their compliance with these guidelines in individual cases). 
35 See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 207-14 (arguing that “[t]he reasons for a judicial 
check of prosecutors’ discretion are stronger than for such a check of other adminis-
trative discretion that is now traditionally reviewable,” but recognizing that his pro-
posal “is contrary to the settled judicial tradition” (emphasis omitted)). 
36 See, e.g., Donald G. Gifford, Equal Protection and the Prosecutor’s Charging Decision:  
Enforcing an Ideal, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 685-717 (1981) (suggesting greater judi-
cial inquiry into prosecutors’ motives in deciding whether to bring charges); Anne Bo-
wen Poulin, Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution:  Enforcing Protection After 
United States v. Armstrong, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1071, 1106-19 (1996) (proposing 
greater judicial discretion to order discovery about prosecutorial charging practices, 
suggesting other sources of evidence that judges could weigh, and recommending a 
clearer judicial definition of selective prosecution); Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial In-
tent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1365-66, 1476-77 (1987) 
(advocating judicial review of prosecutorial decisions based more on objective stan-
dards and less on prosecutors’ intent, and taking for granted that “[t]he courts are the 
most important, and in many instances the only, check on prosecutorial misbehavior”). 
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In theory, courts review prosecutors’ charging decisions at pre-
liminary hearings and on motions to dismiss or motions for acquittal.  
In practice, however, they have been loath to interfere.  Courts nomi-
nally forbid selective prosecution based on race.  No race-based claim 
has succeeded for more than a century, however.37  Courts refuse even 
to allow discovery of prosecutors’ policies and decisions unless the 
claimant already has “some evidence that similarly situated defendants 
of other races could have been prosecuted, but were not.”38  This high 
hurdle creates a chicken-and-egg problem.  Claimants cannot get dis-
covery unless they already have “some evidence,” but usually discovery 
is the only possible source of evidence.  Courts are hesitant to review 
decisions about whether to prosecute because they are less competent 
to weigh all the relevant factors.39  They also fear intruding upon the 
executive’s province, because revealing prosecutorial information 
could “chill law enforcement . . . [and] undermine prosecutorial ef-
fectiveness.”40
Courts are even more reluctant to scrutinize decision criteria that 
do not fall within constitutionally protected classes.  The separation of 
powers, courts hold, forbids judicial interference with prosecutorial 
discretion to decline to file charges.41  Preliminary hearings ask simply 
whether there is probable cause, which the police officer must have 
37 The last successful claim of racially selective prosecution appears to have been 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373 (1886), which held that city officials violated 
equal protection by enforcing fire-safety ordinances almost exclusively against Chinese 
immigrants. 
38 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 469 (1996). 
39 See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (“Such factors as the 
strength of a case, the prosecution’s general deterrence value, the Government’s en-
forcement priorities, and the case’s relationship to the Government’s overall enforce-
ment plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent 
to undertake.”). 
40 Id.
41 See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 379-83 (2d 
Cir. 1973) (holding that courts lack the capacity to review prosecutors’ decisions not to 
prosecute prison officials); United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1965) (re-
versing contempt citation imposed on a prosecutor who refused to sign a grand jury 
indictment charging perjury); Powell v. Katzenbach, 359 F.2d 234, 234-35 (D.C. Cir. 
1965) (per curiam) (affirming the dismissal of a complaint that sought mandamus to 
require the U.S. Attorney General to prosecute a bank for conspiracy); MARC L.
MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT, CRIMINAL PROCEDURES 908 (3d ed. 2007) (noting that 
“[ j]udges might overturn a prosecutor’s decision to file charges or not to file charges, 
but only in rare circumstances” and that even in a “strong minority of states” that ex-
plicitly authorize judicial review, judges are “very deferential”). 
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had to arrest in the first place.42  Assuming that the prosecutor can 
clear this very low threshold, judges do not interfere with discretion-
ary decisions about which charge to select or whether and how to plea 
bargain.43  Courts find no problem even when prosecutors use coer-
cive sentencing differentials as plea-bargaining leverage.44
Traditionally, indeterminate sentencing has given judges some 
power at sentencing to check or counterbalance prosecutorial charg-
ing and bargaining decisions.  Mandatory-minimum penalties and 
sentencing guidelines, however, along with the multiplication and 
fragmentation of the criminal code, have steadily eroded this power.  
Even in the majority of states that retain indeterminate sentencing, 
statutory mandatory penalties and menus of overlapping crimes give 
prosecutors the dominant role in setting sentences.45
Moreover, for judges to serve as meaningful checks, they would 
have to thwart bargains struck by prosecutors and defense lawyers.  
Doing so is extremely hard in an adversarial system.  First, the parties 
are the main source of sentencing information, and they are not 
forthcoming about any facts that would undermine the sentence upon 
42 See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(e) (requiring a magistrate to find probable cause 
that the defendant has committed a crime to bind the defendant over for further pro-
ceedings); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 415-17 (1976) (noting that police 
officers may arrest a suspect if they have probable cause). 
43 See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (“[S]o long as the prose-
cutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring be-
fore a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.”).  Judges in a few jurisdic-
tions do take more aggressive roles, but they appear to be outliers.  See MILLER &
WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 1185 (reporting that the federal system and a majority of 
state systems forbid judicial participation in plea negotiations while another group of 
states discourages it, and noting that more than a dozen states do not discourage or 
may even authorize judicial participation, though this participation may be limited to 
responding to parties’ invitations or commenting on the parties’ proposals). 
44 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 365 (upholding the imposition of a life sentence 
after trial upon a defendant who refused to accept a five-year plea bargain). 
45 I have written about these topics at length elsewhere.  See Stephanos Bibas, The 
Feeney Amendment and the Continuing Rise of Prosecutorial Power to Plea Bargain, 94 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 295 (2004) (describing how changes to the Sentencing Guidelines 
have increased prosecutorial leverage and limited judicial oversight); Stephanos Bibas, 
Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 
1097, 1151-70 (2001) (discussing how Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
may perversely have increased prosecutors’ powers to plea bargain in some cases).  
George Fisher and William Stuntz have elaborated on these problems as well.  See
GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH 208-29 (2003) (discussing mandatory 
minima and sentencing guidelines); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 4, at 512-23 
(discussing how criminal codes’ breadth and depth transfer power from courts to 
prosecutors and police). 
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which they have agreed.46  Probation officers’ supposedly independent 
presentence investigations are only a modest check on the parties’ col-
lusion.47  Judges would find it hard and costly to monitor disclosure of 
all relevant information, and most judges do not view it as their job to 
intervene actively in plea bargaining.48  Second, to vary from the par-
ties’ recommendation, the judge would have to disregard his own 
strong self-interest in encouraging pleas.  If a judge fails to defer con-
sistently, the parties will be less willing to bargain and so will burden 
that judge’s courtroom with more trials.49
Judges may have some tools with which to check prosecutorial dis-
cretion in individual cases, but these tools miss deeper problems.  The 
most important problems of prosecutorial discretion are systemic 
ones.  For example, one prosecutor grants leniency in case A but not 
as much in case B.  Neither the judge nor the defense attorney in case 
A will complain about the prosecutor’s leniency, particularly if the 
judge shares the commonplace view that many penalties are already 
too high.50  And in case B, so long as the facts fit the statute that pre-
scribes the higher penalty, the defense attorney is in a poor position 
to challenge the prosecutor’s charging decision.  He may not even 
know of case A, let alone enough of its specifics to analogize it to case 
B.  If he is a repeat player who does know this past history, he is much 
more likely to be getting the more generous type A bargains by using 
46 See Prob. Officers Advisory Group to the U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Probation Of-
ficers’ Survey, FED. SENT’G REP., May/June 1996, at 303, 305-06, 310-11 (reporting that 
parties frequently withhold or misstate facts that would contradict plea agreements). 
47 See id. at 306, 311-13 (reporting that when a probation officer’s version of facts 
and calculations differs from the parties’ version, many judges defer to the parties’ ver-
sion instead of investigating and relying on a more accurate version); cf. Nancy J. King, 
Judicial Oversight of Negotiated Sentences in a World of Bargained Punishment, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 293, 304-06 (2005) (suggesting better funding and standards for presentence in-
vestigations, as well as pre-plea review of sentencing information). 
48 See, e.g., United States v. Yeje-Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 28 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
costs of monitoring compliance with such a mandatory disclosure system are high, and 
many of the efficiencies created by plea bargaining would be lost. . . . [Also,] the fed-
eral rules prohibit involvement by a trial judge in plea bargaining.”).  Nevertheless, 
academics continue to recommend more vigorous judicial oversight.  See, e.g., Oren 
Gazal-Ayal, Partial Ban on Plea Bargains, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2295 (2006) (recommend-
ing that judges reject plea bargains that result in large sentencing reductions). 
49 See FISHER, supra note 45, at 131-33 (explaining that a century ago in Massachu-
setts, parties made a point of pleading before those judges who habitually followed 
parties’ sentencing recommendations). 
50 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III & Michael Heise, Quiet Rebellion?  Explaining 
Nearly a Decade of Declining Federal Drug Sentences, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1043, 1131-33 (2001) 
(marshalling evidence that many judges view federal drug penalties as too harsh and 
are happy to go along with plea bargains that subvert them). 
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other cases as informal precedents in negotiations.  The real problem 
afflicts bad, unconnected, or inexperienced defense counsel, who are 
much more likely to get type B bargains. 
Nor can the judge do much about type B bargains.  The prosecu-
tor has followed the words of the statute, the legislature has author-
ized the higher-penalty option, and there is almost never enough evi-
dence of unconstitutional bias.51  Individual trial judges are limited by 
the confines of particular cases and controversies.  They are not well 
suited to take the synoptic, bird’s-eye view needed to police systemic 
concerns about equality, arbitrariness, leniency, and overcharging.  
They lack statistical training and expertise, as well as detailed informa-
tion from prosecutors’ files.  Their choices ex post are often crude 
and binary, requiring them either to find statistical disparities uncon-
stitutional or to put their imprimatur on them.52  At most, judges see 
their job as ferreting out purposeful discrimination case by case.  They 
trust elected legislatures to weigh statistics and fashion flexible, 
workable systemic remedies.53  Judicially enforceable models of equal-
ity are poorly suited to balance the myriad practical and policy con-
siderations that prosecutors legitimately take into account.  Yet, as 
Kenneth Culp Davis argued, official inaction and arbitrary leniency 
are deeper, more systematic problems than the illegal actions that 
judges are used to reviewing.54
The most that one could expect from judges is some review of a 
prosecutor’s stated reasons for a charging or sentencing differential.  
Unfortunately, experience teaches that this kind of review is not 
promising.  A prosecutor, for example, can almost always come up 
with a facially plausible reason for differentiating two prospective ju-
rors.55  The same is probably true of charging decisions, especially 
51 See supra text accompanying notes 37-38 (discussing the impossibly high threshold 
for even gaining discovery on selective-prosecution claims); see also McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 287, 292 (1987) (rejecting constitutional challenges to Georgia’s capital-
sentencing system despite massive statistical evidence of race-of-victim disparities, because 
petitioner lacked direct evidence of discriminatory purpose in his particular case). 
52 See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 279 (“[W]e would demand exceptionally clear proof 
before we would infer that . . . discretion has been abused.”). 
53 See id. at 319. 
54 See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 14, 170-72 (noting “[t]hat illegal inaction is much eas-
ier than illegal action” and that leniency in enforcement makes possible injustice and 
discrimination). 
55 See Michael J. Raphael & Edward J. Ungvarsky, Excuses, Excuses:  Neutral Explana-
tions Under Batson v. Kentucky, 27 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 229, 266 (1993) (concluding, 
based on an empirical survey of post-Batson cases, “that Batson’s neutral explanation 
requirement is, regrettably, a relatively simple hurdle for a prosecutor to clear.  Even a 
974 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 959
when judges limit themselves to the criteria that they are most com-
fortable policing, such as race and sex.  The justifications for punish-
ment are so conflicting and indeterminate that, on a case-by-case ba-
sis, a clever prosecutor can argue for almost any disposition within a 
very broad ballpark.  If judicial oversight is to mean anything, it will 
have to be coupled with some other measure to generate more con-
crete rules that judges can enforce. 
For similar reasons, private causes of action against prosecutors 
are unworkable.  Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damage 
suits for actions that they take in their official capacity, to preserve 
their independence and prevent harassment.56  One could abrogate 
this immunity by statute or case law, as some writers suggest.57  It is 
hard, however, to see judges and juries having much appetite for 
awarding damages against prosecutors except in the most egregious 
cases.  And, as I have already argued, the root problem is not so much 
individual injustices as it is inequitable, inconsistent patterns of discre-
tion that emerge from myriad cases.  Damage suits are not tailored to 
address systemic shortcomings, nor can I see how judges could enter 
structural-reform injunctions that could do that well.  (How would 
judges generate the prosecutorial rules, priorities, and criteria that 
they would enjoin prosecutors to follow?  How would these injunc-
tions mesh with keeping prosecutors elected and democratically ac-
countable?)  The same problems prevent the threat of criminal 
charges from regulating prosecutors effectively.58  Much as doctors 
prosecutor who has dismissed jurors for racial reasons can concoct a neutral explana-
tion for his actions that the courts will accept as proof that his strikes were not racially 
motivated”). 
56 See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427-28 (1976) (articulating common law 
immunity and extending it to civil rights suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 
57 See, e.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 
BYU L. REV. 53, 55-57 (arguing that qualified prosecutorial immunity would be suffi-
cient to preserve the benefits of absolute immunity while making it easier to combat 
misconduct); Lesley E. Williams, Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3441, 3479-80 (1999) (concluding that qualified immunity would strike a better 
balance than absolute immunity between protecting well-meaning prosecutors and 
holding willful wrongdoers liable). 
58 But cf. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429 (suggesting, without support, that criminal prose-
cution could punish and deter prosecutorial misconduct effectively).  Prosecutors are 
prosecuted once in a great while, though prosecutions are probably too rare to influ-
ence prosecutors’ behavior.  See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau, Ex-Prosecutor in Terror Inquiry Is In-
dicted, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at A18 (noting indictment of prosecutor whose pres-
entation of false evidence and concealment of damaging evidence led to the collapse 
of a high-profile terrorism prosecution). 
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hesitate to testify in medical-malpractice cases, one prosecutor may be 
reluctant to prosecute another except in cases of outright corruption. 
In short, traditional judicial regulation is about as unpromising as 
legislative regulation.  Judicial oversight, like legislative oversight, 
could perhaps shore up an otherwise sound regulatory system, but it 
cannot do much by itself. 
C. Bar Authorities’ Rules and Discipline 
In declining to regulate prosecutors through damage actions, the 
Supreme Court expressed hope that bar authorities would fulfill an 
equivalent role.  As the Court put it, “a prosecutor stands perhaps 
unique, among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitu-
tional rights, in his amenability to professional discipline by an associa-
tion of his peers.”59  Indeed, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility regulate prosecu-
tors as well as other lawyers.60  Every state has adopted a disciplinary sys-
tem based to some extent on either the Model Code or the Model 
Rules.61  Among other prohibitions, these rules prohibit fraud, deceit, 
presenting false testimony, and, most specifically, suppressing exculpa-
tory evidence.62  Provisions in both the Model Code and the Model 
Rules specifically forbid filing criminal charges without probable 
cause.63  The McDade Amendment, which bound federal prosecutors 
to follow the same ethical restrictions as other lawyers, reflects some 
political willingness to empower bar authorities.64  And, in a handful of 
59 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 429. 
60 See Rosen, supra note 12, at 708-14 (discussing the ethical limits on prosecutors’ 
use of false evidence or withholding exculpatory evidence, including provisions of the 
Model Code and the Model Rules); Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prose-
cutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721, 739 tbl.IV (2001) (cataloguing thirty provisions of the 
Model Rules of which prosecutors are likely to run afoul); cf. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 
161 (suggesting the creation of separate disciplinary rules and processes tailored to 
prosecutors’ special role). 
61 See Rosen, supra note 12, at 715 (“All of the states have based their disciplinary 
codes to some degree on either the Model Code or Model Rules.”). 
62 See id. (noting that every state has forbidden fraud, deceit, and presenting false 
testimony but that only the “vast majority” of them have enacted rules specifically for-
bidding prosecutors to suppress exculpatory evidence). 
63 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2006); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980). 
64 See 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (2006) (subjecting government attorneys to the state 
rules and laws and to the local rules of federal court of each state in which they prac-
tice).  For a fascinating explanation of how the McDade Amendment was a backlash 
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cases, bar authorities have reprimanded or even disbarred prosecutors 
in the wake of flagrant, publicized prosecutorial misconduct.65
By and large, however, bar authorities have proven to be ineffec-
tual.  One empirical survey found that state bar authorities had re-
viewed only fourteen cases in six years in which prosecutors had sup-
pressed exculpatory or impeachment evidence.  Much of the 
misconduct was egregious, involving, for example, suborning perjury, 
altering evidence, and lying to the court.  Nevertheless, bar authorities 
dismissed six of the cases, reprimanded, censured, or cautioned six 
prosecutors, suspended one, and disbarred only one.66
A second study focused on suppression of exculpatory evidence or 
knowing use of false evidence in homicide cases.  The nationwide sur-
vey examined the rulings of bar disciplinary authorities as well as 
courts between 1963 and 1999.  Though courts reversed at least 381 
homicide convictions on these grounds, not a single prosecutor was 
convicted of a crime or disbarred as a result.  Indeed, many of these 
prosecutors went on to enjoy successful careers as district attorneys or 
judges.  One was elected to Congress.67
against the unsuccessful prosecution of Representative Joseph McDade, see Lerner, 
supra note 22, at 641-42, 650-56. 
65 See Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the Road to the Disbarment of 
Mike Nifong:  The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discovery, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 257, 
257, 266-70, 276-84, 302-06 (2008) (discussing two special prosecutors who were repri-
manded by bar authorities for unintentionally failing to turn over Brady material, two 
prosecutors who were never pursued by bar authorities because statutes of limitations 
protected them from discipline, and the notorious prosecutor of the Duke lacrosse 
players, who was disbarred after extensive publicity surrounding a deeply flawed prose-
cution).  Note, however, that the prosecutor of the Duke lacrosse players was flayed in 
the media and removed from the case once the suppressed exculpatory material came 
to light.  His later disbarment piggybacked on the information that had already come to 
light; it was a backstop to, rather than the principal check on, his misconduct. 
 Bar authorities have imposed sanctions on prosecutors in a couple of other excep-
tional recent cases.  See In re Zawada, 92 P.3d 862, 862 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc) (suspend-
ing a prosecutor for unethical cross-examination); In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 764 (Ariz. 
2004) (en banc) (disbarring a prosecutor for purposely presenting false testimony). 
66 See Rosen, supra note 12, at 720-31 (reporting the results of an empirical survey 
of reported cases and survey forms returned by forty-one out of fifty state disciplinary 
boards, and noting that the one disbarment was pending on appeal as of the comple-
tion of the study). 
67 See Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Break Rules, Be Promoted, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
14, 1999, at 1 (noting that many prosecutors who commit misconduct are nevertheless 
promoted); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict:  Dishonor, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 
10, 1999, at 1 (reporting that even though 381 homicide convictions had been re-
versed since 1963 because prosecutors had withheld exculpatory evidence or know-
ingly used false evidence, not a single one of the prosecutors responsible received sig-
nificant punishment).  Another newspaper study reviewed 1500 allegations of 
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A third survey found that courts and bar authorities disciplined 
prosecutors more than 100 times over the last 113 years for all kinds of 
professional misconduct.68  Many of the cases involved prosecutors 
who committed crimes, such as bribery, extortion, embezzlement, and 
conversion.  Many others involved presenting false evidence, with-
holding exculpatory evidence, or lying to or deceiving the court.  The 
only other significant categories of cases involved criticizing judges, 
neglecting duty, fixing traffic tickets, contacting represented defen-
dants ex parte, and having conflicts of interest as a part-time prosecu-
tor.69  In short, “prosecutors are disciplined rarely, both in the abstract 
and relative to private lawyers.”70  And when they are disciplined, they 
usually have committed multiple violations,71 at least one of which falls 
within the serious categories listed above. 
Because sanctions are rare and usually amount to a censure or 
other slap on the wrist, their deterrent value is minimal.72  It may be 
that bar authorities have bigger fish to fry, such as blatant financial 
pilfering by civil lawyers.  Because prosecutors lack ordinary clients, 
there is no one who needs bar authorities’ leverage to gain restitution, 
nor is there anyone with enough incentive to file grievances.73  Separa-
prosecutorial misconduct over a ten-year period.  Though the study turned up hun-
dreds of discovery violations involving exculpatory or impeachment evidence, 
“[p]rosecutors who violated discovery rules were seldom punished.  Many violated dis-
covery rules over and over again.”  Bill Moushey, Hiding the Facts:  Discovery Violations 
Have Made Evidence-Gathering a Shell Game, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, Nov. 24, 1998, at A1. 
68 See Zacharias, supra note 60, at 743, 744 & n.83, 745 & n.86, 746-50 (considering 
reported cases as old as 1886 and through about 1999). 
69 See id. at 745-48. 
70 Id. at 755. 
71 See id. (“Violation of a single rule rarely suffices to produce bar action.”). 
72 In theory, the paucity of cases brought could mean that the sanctions are work-
ing and deterring most prosecutorial misconduct.  As the studies discussed above show, 
however, serious misconduct still occurs and is sanctioned too lightly to deter effec-
tively.  See Stephanos Bibas, Brady v. Maryland:  From Adversarial Gamesmanship Toward 
the Search for Innocence?, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 129, 144-46 (Carol Steiker 
ed., 2006) (reporting an empirical study of 210 Brady and Giglio cases decided in 2004 
and of 448 Brady and Giglio claims that succeeded or were remanded between 1959 
and August 2004). 
73 See Zacharias, supra note 60, at 757-59 (noting that self-serving intentional mis-
conduct by lawyers tarnishes the reputation of the bar the most, and also explaining 
that bar authorities discount grievances filed by defendants and their counsel, lest bar 
proceedings degenerate into collateral litigation used to secure a tactical advantage in 
criminal cases). 
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tion-of-powers concerns can also make bar authorities hesitate to in-
trude upon prosecutors’ province.74
While all of these reasons carry some weight, I think the larger 
problem is the same one that hobbles judicial review.  The root prob-
lem is not gross misconduct in individual cases, though misconduct 
does occur.  If that were the issue, then beefing up enforcement re-
sources or sanctions, or creating a new prosecutorial-review commis-
sion, might perhaps help.75  The deeper problem is that systemic pat-
terns of charging and plea bargaining, influenced by self-interest, bias, 
and other considerations, may undercut equality and equity.  Ex post, 
case-by-case review is no answer, particularly review by outsiders with-
out access to confidential police and prosecutor files.  Bar disciplinary 
rules understandably limit themselves to clear, gross, and discrete mis-
conduct, such as lying, withholding evidence, fraud, and embezzle-
ment.  Bar rules cannot capture the myriad complex factors that 
rightly or wrongly influence patterns of prosecutorial discretion across 
cases.  Writing and policing rules from the outside will not work any 
better for bar authorities than it has for courts, so bar authorities have 
not even tried to do so. 
*      *      * 
By and large, traditional external regulation has shown itself to be 
ineffectual, at least as a source of rules and priorities.  Ex ante rules 
generated by outsiders, such as legislatures, are too crude to address 
and adapt to the myriad changing circumstances, resource limitations, 
and crime patterns that prosecutors face.  Moreover, legislatures have 
strong incentives to err on the side of overbroad statutes, rather than 
risk hobbling prosecutors and letting criminals escape through loop-
holes.  Ex post policing by outsiders, such as legislatures, judges, and 
bar authorities, may weed out a few egregious cases but not attack sys-
temic patterns or arbitrariness.  Outsiders lack the information, the 
74 See id. at 761 (suggesting that since bar authorities in most jurisdictions are con-
trolled by the judicial branch, whereas prosecutors are functionaries of the executive, 
disciplinary agencies may shrink from investigating prosecutors on separation-of-
powers grounds). 
75 See Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:  Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 463-64 (2001) (proposing the creation of prosecution-
review boards to randomly review prosecutorial decisions); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seek-
ing the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:  Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1114-15 (1994) (proposing a prosecutorial-conduct com-
mission to investigate misconduct by prosecutors). 
2009] Prosecutorial Regulation, Prosecutorial Accountability 979
sustained oversight, and the policy expertise to craft and police prose-
cutorial guidelines.  Scrutiny by outsiders is sporadic, prosecutorial 
files are sensitive and detailed, and prosecutors can concoct ex post, 
ad hoc rationalizations.  Prosecutors may even resist external rules as 
illegitimate intrusions upon their traditional policy discretion.  Legis-
latures, judges, and bar authorities may all play constructive roles, but 
only as backstops, as enforcers of rules and standards that originate 
from within prosecutors’ offices.  We need to look for other ways to 
motivate prosecutors to write and apply their own rules. 
II. EXTERNAL PRESSURE BY STAKEHOLDERS
Traditional external regulation has failed to regulate prosecuto-
rial discretion.  Instead, we should attack the problem as one of 
agency costs.  Many authors have noted that prosecution involves a 
classic principal-agent problem.  Some, such as Frank Easterbrook, 
simply dismiss this agency-cost problem as “true but trivial” without se-
riously considering reforms.76  Others, such as Albert Alschuler and 
Stephen Schulhofer, view the agency costs as so serious that they 
would abolish plea bargaining entirely.77  The abolitionists, however, 
do not discuss lesser, more workable restrictions on prosecutorial dis-
cretion.  Nor do they explore other prosecutorial issues, such as selec-
tive prosecution and decisions not to charge.78  There is remarkably 
little exploration of the middle ground between these extremes.79
76 Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD.
289, 309 (1983); see also id. at 294-95, 300-01, 314-15 (using economic analysis to illus-
trate problems with the state’s ability to inflict harsh punishment, prosecutorial regula-
tion, and plea bargaining); Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 
YALE L.J. 1969, 1975-77 (1992) (belittling agency costs and criticizing “the lure of regu-
lation” in the context of plea bargaining). 
77 See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 16, at 105-12 (arguing that prosecutors are 
tempted to serve their self-interests in high conviction statistics and so fail to act in the 
public interest when plea bargaining, without using agency-cost terminology); Schul-
hofer, supra note 16, at 1987-88 (noting that there are two sets of agency problems in 
plea bargaining:  one involving the public and the district attorney and one involving 
the district attorney and his assistants, who may likewise have interests that diverge 
from those of their superior). 
78 Schulhofer, for example, devotes only a single sentence to judicial and supervi-
sory review of decisions to charge or not charge.  See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal 
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 52 (1988) (acknowledging 
that the current system of judicial and supervisory review of decisions to charge or not 
to charge maximizes deterrence at minimum cost). 
79 There are a handful of exceptions, though each one touches on only a corner 
of the problem.  See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior:  Influencing Prose-
cutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 873-75 
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The agency-cost perspective suggests a regulatory strategy mod-
eled on corporate governance, which has long dealt with similar is-
sues.  Shareholders or stakeholders in corporations are the principals, 
and they need information and tools to align their agents’ incentives 
with their own.  Top managers are most accountable to these stake-
holders, so they feel external pressures most directly.  Managers then 
translate these external pressures into internal rules and incentives to 
induce lower-level employees to serve their principals. 
The concept of stakeholders is malleable and fuzzy.  Classically, 
corporate scholars have modeled shareholders as the principals and 
corporate employees as the agents.  This approach views the sole duty 
of corporate management as maximizing shareholder wealth.80  It 
gives corporate management a simple, clear direction and metric—
maximize share prices—at the cost of omitting other values and inter-
ests.  Revisionist corporate scholarship argues for broadening man-
agement’s responsibilities beyond shareholders to include stake-
holders. Stakeholders could include employees, retired employees, 
bondholders, suppliers, contractors, and the local community.81  The 
stakeholder approach serves a richer array of ends but makes it harder 
to specify metrics of success and how to weight each one. 
(1995) (suggesting the use of monetary rewards to minimize tactical overcharging and 
charge bargaining); Daniel Richman, Institutional Coordination and Sentencing Reform, 84 
TEX. L. REV. 2055, 2063-64, 2072-74 (2006) (suggesting that sentencing reform can 
empower sentencing judges and head prosecutors to regulate line prosecutors’ plea 
bargaining). 
80 For classic statements of this position, see, for example, A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate 
Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931), arguing that “all powers 
granted to a corporation or the management of a corporation . . . are necessarily and 
at all times exercisable only for the ratable benefit of all the shareholders as their in-
terest appears.”  See also Milton Friedman, A Friedman Doctrine—The Social Responsibility 
of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32 (likening the 
doctrine of “social responsibility” of business to socialism). 
81 The leading recent critic of the shareholder-primacy thesis is Lynn Stout.  See, 
e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 
VA. L. REV. 247, 250-55, 276-81 (1999) (arguing that employees, managers, creditors, 
and others cannot specify all of their interests in detailed contracts ex ante, and so they 
prefer instead to trust that directors will accord them fair consideration in the distribu-
tion of profits); Lynn A. Stout, Bad and Not-So-Bad Arguments for Shareholder Primacy, 75 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1189, 1190-99, 1208 (2002) (identifying three common arguments for 
shareholder primacy and explaining flaws in them); Lynn A. Stout, New Thinking on 
“Shareholder Primacy” 28 ( Jan. 10, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.law.ucla.edu/docs/bus.sloan-stout.pdf (noting that several scholars have 
recently argued that, contrary to conventional shareholder-primacy theory, “share-
holders themselves might prefer more stakeholder-friendly director primacy rules”). 
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Likewise, one could focus exclusively on head prosecutors’ re-
sponsibilities to voters, who in a democracy are the closest analogue to 
shareholders.  Shareholders can vote corporate executives out of of-
fice or vote with their feet by selling shares.  A crude directive might 
be to maximize convictions and sentences of factually guilty defen-
dants, particularly violent felons.  This approach is analytically clean 
and measurable, but it leaves out many of the broader responsibilities 
that we often attribute to prosecutors.  For instance, sometimes doing 
justice entails going easy on a sympathetic defendant or devoting ex-
tra time to hearing out a wounded victim.  A richer though fuzzier 
approach would treat head prosecutors as beholden to a variety of 
stakeholders as well as voters.  These stakeholders might include line 
prosecutors, judges, private and public defenders, defendants and 
their families, potential victims, and local residents.  For the sake of 
simplicity, I will focus on the three groups most directly affected—
voters, victims, and defendants—even though each group is itself 
broad and varied.  Victims are analogous to customers.  The analogy 
does not work as well for defendants, who in some ways resemble cus-
tomers and in others resemble competing firms.  Even as prosecutors 
pursue defendants, or corporations compete, each bears legal and 
moral obligations to compete fairly, without striking low blows.82
Unlike shareholders and customers, victims and defendants lack many 
tools to influence prosecutors.83
This corporate model may seem incongruous.  After all, we expect 
prosecutors to pursue justice, not just raw preferences or convictions 
or years in prison.  But if prosecutors are not simply to foist their own 
priorities upon everybody, they must heed and aggregate the sense of 
82 The Supreme Court famously declared that a prosecutor “may prosecute with 
earnestness and vigor—indeed, he should do so.  But, while he may strike hard blows, 
he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.”  Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).  
For example, prosecutors may not withhold exculpatory evidence, misrepresent facts, 
or discriminate on morally irrelevant criteria. 
83 One could break down these categories into subcategories.  The general public is 
not quite the same as the voting public; most felons and aliens, for example, cannot vote.  
One could look at the public nationwide or focus on how particular locales and commu-
nities view crime.  Likewise, one could look not only at direct victims, but also at their 
family and friends, bystanders to crime, and other locals who are indirectly affected by a 
crime.  Subclasses of defendants vary based on race, class, locale, and prior record, and 
defendants’ families and defense lawyers’ perspectives vary from those of defendants 
themselves.  The interests, knowledge, and relative power of each of these subgroups vary 
slightly.  For the sake of analytical simplicity, however, Section II.A aggregates the differ-
ent segments of the public, while Section II.B aggregates the different victim-related 
groups and Section II.C aggregates the different defendant-related groups. 
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justice of various groups whom they supposedly serve.  These groups 
seem to have irreconcilable interests, but prosecutors must somehow 
aggregate their views and interests under any system.  Moreover, Paul 
Robinson and Robert Kurzban have found surprising empirical con-
sensus on ranking different offenders’ just deserts.  There is indeed 
core agreement on ranking which offenders deserve the most pun-
ishment, both across Americans and around the world.84  Heeding this 
community conception of justice is crucial to maintain the criminal 
law’s compliance, efficacy, and legitimacy in the public’s eyes.85  Like-
wise, the public shares a sense of procedural justice—of how the legal 
system should treat defendants fairly and respectfully, regardless of 
the substantive outcome that it reaches.  Procedural justice is critical 
to maintaining the legal system’s legitimacy and the public’s willing-
ness to comply with it.86
Of course, punishment serves multiple conflicting functions.  A 
mentally ill offender may simultaneously seem less blameworthy but 
more dangerous.  Some prosecutors and some citizens emphasize ret-
ribution, while others may care more about deterrence, incapacita-
tion, or rehabilitation.  But aggregating and reconciling these compet-
ing purposes has to begin somewhere, and Robinson’s empirical 
evidence suggests that survey respondents consistently focus and agree 
on offenders’ just deserts.  The aggregation of stakeholders’ views will 
never be an elegant equation, whether it occurs in prosecutors’ heads 
or in stakeholders’ aggregated votes.  Either way, the alternatives are 
to leave prosecutors to their idiosyncratic preferences or to discipline 
them so that they at least roughly track those of citizens, victims, and 
defendants. 
This Part considers the first prong of my two-prong strategy:  ex-
ternal pressure by stakeholders upon prosecutors, particularly head 
84 See Paul H. Robinson & Robert Kurzban, Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of 
Justice, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1829, 1846-92 (2007) (finding, based on empirical studies, re-
markable agreement across groups and cultures on the relative seriousness of violent, 
property, and deception crimes, and lesser but still significant agreement about drug 
and sex offenses). 
85 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 68 (1990) (noting that the sense 
that the law accords with one’s sense of justice is the most important influence on 
people’s decision to follow the law); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of 
Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 468-71 (1997) (noting that people “generally see them-
selves as moral beings who want to do the right thing as they perceive it”). 
86 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PRO-
CEDURAL JUSTICE 76-81, 106, 208, 215 (1988); TYLER, supra note 85, at 94-109, 125-34, 
146-47, 161-69, 178. 
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prosecutors.  Section A considers how to give the public more informa-
tion and influence over prosecutors, by, for example, improving prose-
cutorial elections.87  Section B then turns to victims and reviews ways to 
give them greater information about and influence over prosecutorial 
decisions.  Section C considers how defendants could play appropriate 
roles in monitoring prosecutors and providing feedback, without giv-
ing defendants license to let themselves off the hook. 
A.  Informing and Empowering the General Public 
Though in theory prosecutors serve the public interest, the public 
cannot monitor whether they are in fact serving the public well.  Voter 
turnout is low, especially in local elections.  Members of the public 
have sparse and unreliable information about how well prosecutors 
perform.  Most public information about criminal justice comes from 
crime dramas or novels, reality television shows, or sensational, unrep-
resentative news stories.88  As a result, the public suffers from chronic 
misperceptions about how the criminal justice system actually works.89
The public also has very little power to influence criminal justice.  
Grand juries act as rubber stamps for prosecutors, and prosecutors 
circumvent petit juries by plea bargaining in most cases.90
The one remaining check on prosecutors is political.  While fed-
eral prosecutors are appointed, most chief prosecutors are elected at 
the county, judicial circuit, or district level.91  Assuming that head 
prosecutors want to win reelection and move on to higher office, they 
should tailor their behavior to serve voters’ interests and opinions.92
87 In theory, democratic legislatures should already be policing prosecutors on the 
voters’ behalf, but structural democratic deficits keep this mechanism from working 
well.  See Bibas, supra note 5, at 920-31 (arguing that structural changes to the criminal 
justice system beginning in the eighteenth century have created a system largely 
shielded from public scrutiny); Stuntz, Pathological Politics, supra note 4, at 528-39, 552 
(discussing the incentives facing prosecutors, legislatures, and the courts); infra Section 
II.A.  We need new efforts to make prosecutors more responsive to their principals. 
88 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 924-26. 
89 See id. at 927-28. 
90 See id. at 929-30. 
91 See Carol J. DeFrances, Prosecutors in State Courts, 2001, BUREAU JUST. STAT.
BULL., May 2002, app. (reporting that every state except for Alaska, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and the District of Columbia elects its chief prosecutors; that thirty of the states 
have head prosecutors for each county; and that sixteen states have head prosecutors 
for each judicial circuit or district). 
92 See Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. Huber, Citizen Oversight and the Electoral Incen-
tives of Criminal Prosecutors, 46 AM. J. POL. SCI. 334, 349 (2002) (concluding, based on 
formal modeling, that electoral incentives may encourage prosecutors to pursue justice). 
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Unfortunately, this political check is not working.  Voters, swayed 
by the availability heuristic, are focusing on memorable but unrepre-
sentative stories.  Many news stories and campaign ads emphasize a 
head prosecutor’s success or failure in a few high-profile criminal 
cases.  For example, Los Angeles District Attorney Gil Garcetti won of-
fice by attacking his predecessor’s record of acquittals in the Rodney 
King beating case and the McMartin preschool-child-molestation 
cases.  In turn, Garcetti’s 1996 challenger hammered him for failing 
to convict Snoop Doggy Dogg, Lyle and Erik Menendez, and O.J. 
Simpson of murder.93  The acquittal of O.J. Simpson probably con-
tributed to Garcetti’s eventual defeat in the 2000 election.94  To take 
another example, much news coverage blamed Colorado prosecutor 
Mark Hurlbert for bringing rape charges against basketball star Kobe 
Bryant only to drop them.  The high-profile loss encouraged an op-
ponent to challenge Hurlbert at the next election, and as a result 
Hulbert nearly lost his job.95
Other news stories focus on scandals in prosecutors’ offices.  
Though bar authorities rarely sanction prosecutorial misconduct, 
newspapers and voters do.  Prosecutors who coach witnesses or  
prosecute innocent defendants based on fabricated, planted evidence 
are liable to lose their jobs as a result.96  Other scandals, even those 
93 See William Claiborne, L.A. District Attorney Garcetti Haunted by Case that Won’t Go 
Away, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1996, at A3 (writing Garcetti’s epitaph as “The Man Who 
Lost the O.J. Simpson Murder Case” and quoting “an exasperated Garcetti” as saying:  
“My God, am I going to be defined by this case forever?”). 
94 See Mitchell Landsberg, Garcetti’s Chances Were Slim, Analysts Say, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 
12, 2000, at B1 (“[Garcetti’s opponent] almost never even mentioned the Simpson 
case.  He didn’t have to.  Voters remembered on their own.”). 
95 See Charlie Brennan, Hard Road for Hurlbert, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS (Denver), 
Sept. 3, 2004, at 39A; Kirk Johnson, Colorado Election Keeps Bryant Debate Bubbling, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 2004, at A18 (noting that Hurlbert’s opponent made the Bryant case 
and its aftermath the centerpiece of his campaign); Steve Lipsher, Bryant Case Dogs DA 
Facing First Election, DENVER POST, Oct. 28, 2004, at 5B; Steve Lipsher, Bryant Prosecutor 
Relieved After Close Call, DENVER POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at 4B; Steve Lipsher, Hurlbert:  No 
Apologies After Dismissal, DENVER POST, Sept. 3, 2004, at 27A (describing Hurlbert as 
“bruised but unapologetic” after the dismissal of the charges). 
96 See, e.g., Ryan Kim, Incumbent D.A. Tossed Out in Sonoma County, S.F. CHRON., 
Mar. 6, 2002, at A24 (attributing the challenger’s success to the collapse of a murder 
case after a videotape surfaced that showed prosecutors coaching key witness); Neil A. 
Lewis, U.S. Lawyer in Terror Case Is Put on Leave, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2006, at A20 (not-
ing that the government forced the lawyer who improperly coached witnesses and thus 
endangered the capital prosecution of Zacarias Moussaoui to take a leave of absence); 
see also Gromer Jeffers Jr. & Holly Becka, Republicans Begin Hunt for DA Candidate, DAL-
LAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 12, 2005, at 13A (noting that the district attorney declined to 
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unrelated to particular prosecutions, garner unwelcome news cover-
age and can doom a district attorney’s reelection prospects.97
A third type of news coverage addresses prosecutors’ systemic 
policies and performance.  Most typically, incumbent prosecutors 
boast about or are attacked for their conviction rates.98  Challengers 
attack incumbents for declining to charge or plea bargaining too 
many cases.99  News coverage also emphasizes crime rates, for which 
incumbents take credit or blame.100  Prosecutors also capture news at-
tention by touting toughness on crime in general or on particularly 
run for reelection because voters would likely have blamed him for a scandal in which 
paid police informants planted fake drugs on innocent people). 
97 See, e.g., Amber Hunt Martin, Viviano Relies on Kin, Flowers in Campaign, DETROIT 
FREE PRESS, Aug. 6, 2004, at 2B (noting that the county prosecutor did not run for reelec-
tion because he faced federal corruption charges); Albert Salvato, Ohio:  Prosecutor Declines 
to Run Again, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2004, at A18 (noting that county prosecutor withdrew 
from the reelection race amid a scandal over an affair with an assistant prosecutor). 
98 See, e.g., Rick Brand, Democrats Bank on Anti-Catterson Theme, NEWSDAY (Long Is-
land, N.Y.), June 5, 1997, at A34 (reporting that a high conviction rate gave the in-
cumbent prosecutor a huge advantage); Dana Hedgpeth, States Attorney Race in Dead 
Heat, BALT. SUN, Nov. 4, 1998, at 9D (reporting that the challenger appeared to have 
barely upset the “heavily favored” incumbent by hammering away at “an embarrass-
ingly low” trial-conviction rate); Jonathan P. Hicks, Staten Island Prosecutor Faces Lawyer 
in Bid for Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1999, at B4 (reporting that a challenger at-
tacked the incumbent for having the lowest conviction rate in New York City); Edito-
rial, Re-Elect Pfingst; Dumanis’ Dismaying Role in Anti-Semitic Slur, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Oct. 17, 2002, at B16 (noting that the incumbent’s office had the highest 
conviction rate in the state); Vivian S. Toy, Top Prosecutor in Queens Plans to Run Again,
N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1999, at B8 (comparing the Queens District Attorney’s conviction 
rate with that of other New York City boroughs); Bill Wallace, San Francisco Ranks Last 
in Convictions, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 17, 2003, at A1 (noting that the low conviction rate 
had become an issue in the incumbent’s campaign for reelection). 
99 See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 61-62, 115 (reporting attacks on plea 
bargaining and declinations in races for New Orleans District Attorney); Hicks, supra
note 98 (noting the challenger’s campaign theme that the incumbent declined to 
prosecute too many crimes); Amy Smith, John Wayne v. Atticus Finch:  Dueling D.A. Can-
didates Differ on Punishment and Prevention, AUSTIN CHRON., Oct. 18, 1996, at 26 (report-
ing the challenger’s criticism of routine plea bargains and low jury-trial rate). 
100 See, e.g., Brand, supra note 98 (reporting that the incumbent took credit for a 
drop in violent crime); Kelly Brewington, State’s Attorney Announces Her Re-Election Bid at 
Fundraiser, BALT. SUN, Aug. 1, 2005, at 1B (noting that the incumbent received blame 
for the high crime rate); Leslie Eaton, Morgenthau Runs on His Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
17, 2005, at B7 (describing a television ad in which the Manhattan District Attorney 
took credit for Manhattan’s record-low crime rate); see also Richman & Stuntz, supra
note 18, at 602-04 (suggesting that voters will hold district attorneys accountable for 
rates of FBI index crimes—murder, manslaughter, rape, arson, kidnapping, aggravated 
assault, robbery, burglary, and auto theft—because they are the most visible). 
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fearsome categories of crime.101  Sometimes, the reverse happens, and 
a candidate gains fame for emphasizing crime prevention or less puni-
tive approaches to juvenile and drug crimes.102
Like a smoky fire, these news stories and ads often cast more heat 
than light on voters’ decisions.  Particular high-profile cases or scandals 
are often unrepresentative of an office’s overall performance and be-
yond a head prosecutor’s control.  Yet voters, relying on the availability 
heuristic, overgeneralize from these memorable, salient anecdotes.103
Thus, scandals are one of the few factors that demonstrably affect elec-
tion outcomes.104  The statistics to which voters have access, primarily 
conviction statistics, are mediocre proxies for an office’s performance.  
Crime rates are often driven by exogenous factors, such as the crack-
cocaine boom or increased police hiring,105 for which prosecutors de-
serve little credit or blame.  Prosecutors can inflate conviction statistics 
by plea bargaining away many cases, especially difficult cases that they 
101 See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 100 (reporting a television ad in which the Manhat-
tan District Attorney emphasized initiatives against guns, gangs, drugs, rapes, child 
abuse, identity theft, and “Internet predators”); Hicks, supra note 98 (reporting the 
challenger’s pledge to be tougher than the incumbent on domestic violence and 
crimes against children); Ryan Kim, This Time, Mullins Has a Challenger, S.F. CHRON.,
Feb. 22, 2002, at 4 (reporting the incumbent’s boasts of toughness on gang violence, 
domestic violence, and other violent crime). 
102 See, e.g., Jennifer Gonnerman, The People’s Prosecutor, VILLAGE VOICE (N.Y.), 
Sept. 22–Sept. 28, 2004, at 40 (reporting that an obscure challenger upset an incum-
bent in Albany’s primary by attacking New York’s tough drug laws and the incumbent’s 
aggressive prosecution of drug cases); Smith, supra note 99 (noting the incumbent 
Travis County District Attorney’s emphasis on juvenile diversion and crime preven-
tion).  Of course, it did not hurt that the Albany challenger was well financed. 
103 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 925-26, 956 (describing how people are drawn to and 
remember sensational but atypical criminal trials and news stories, while giving little 
weight to policies or statistics); Shelley E. Taylor, The Availability Bias in Social Perception 
and Interaction, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 190, 192 
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982) (noting that because of “salience bias,” people 
find distinctive stimuli more available and so rely on them disproportionately in mak-
ing judgments). 
104 An empirical study confirms that media coverage of prosecutorial scandals is 
one of the few factors that significantly reduces a prosecutor’s chances of reelection.  
While there is also suggestive evidence that not losing a major case increases an in-
cumbent’s vote share, that finding was not large enough to be statistically significant.  
Gerard A. Rainville, Differing Incentives of Appointed and Elected Prosecutors and 
the Relationship Between Prosecutor Policy and Votes in Local Elections 91-92 (2002) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, American University, School of Public Affairs) (on 
file with American University Library). 
105 See Steven D. Levitt, Understanding Why Crime Fell in the 1990s:  Four Factors that Ex-
plain the Decline and Six that Do Not, 18 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 163-64 (2004) (citing “in-
creases in the number of police, the rising prison population, the waning crack epidemic 
and the legalization of abortion” as contributing to a decrease in crime in the 1990s). 
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would otherwise have lost at trial.106  Moreover, conviction statistics ig-
nore other important outcomes, such as declinations, sentences, and 
victim satisfaction.  Nevertheless, these statistics are better proxies for 
aggregate performance than isolated anecdotes are.  Though they are 
a staple of campaign rhetoric, however, conviction statistics have no 
demonstrable effect on electoral outcomes.107  Because elections are 
not driven by accurate general assessments of incumbents’ perform-
ance, they do not solve the principal-agent problem. 
Why are prosecutorial elections driven by unreliable anecdotes and 
scandals rather than by more meaningful statistics and policies?  Part 
of the problem, as just suggested, is that juicy, salient anecdotes are 
more memorable and powerful than dry numbers.  Part of the answer 
may be that voters lack clear, comprehensive, and meaningful statistics 
about arrests, charges, pleas, and sentences.108  If, for example, statistics 
revealed racial charging and sentencing disparities, the public might 
clamor for more equality, or at least explanations.  Recent controver-
sies over racial profiling and death-penalty disparities have shown the 
public’s interest in these topics once they came to light.109
Some of the blame rests with uncreative candidates.  Enterprising 
candidates succeed in turning elections into referenda on substantive 
enforcement policies instead of particular anecdotes.  For example, 
long-time New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr., won and 
retained his office by promising to clamp down on plea bargaining.  
He successfully justified his office’s high declination rate as the price 
of restricting bargains.110  And in Albany, an obscure challenger upset 
the incumbent by turning the election into a referendum on his op-
106 See Bibas, supra note 7, at 2472-73 (noting that prosecutors may offer irresistible 
plea deals to dispose of cases that they are unlikely to win at trial). 
107 See Rainville, supra note 104, at 92, 94 (“Perhaps the most central of prosecutor 
performance measures, conviction rates, failed to attain significance in the models.”). 
108 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 955-56 (proposing to compile these statistics to dispel 
common misconceptions about the criminal justice system). 
109 See, e.g., Francis X. Clines, Death Penalty Is Suspended in Maryland, N.Y. TIMES,
May 10, 2002, at A20 (reporting the Maryland Governor’s moratorium on executions 
pending a study of racial disparities in capital punishment); David Kocieniewski, Whit-
man and State Police:  One Answer, Many Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1999, at NJ2 (re-
porting that the political furor that erupted in New Jersey over racial profiling led the 
governor to fire the state police superintendent). 
110 Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 61-62, 115. 
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ponent’s harsh enforcement of the drug laws.111  It is not easy to focus 
voters on the broad issues, but it can be done. 
Some of the blame, though, rests with the electoral process.  Na-
tionwide and statewide races may drown out county elections in the 
media.  District attorneys enjoy access to press conferences and name 
recognition.112  Little-known challengers find it difficult to raise money 
and get the public’s attention.  Incumbent district attorneys thus enjoy 
huge advantages.  In New York City, for example, no challenger has 
unseated an elected incumbent in any of the five boroughs in the last 
fifty years.113  The few challengers who succeed often have enough 
personal wealth or outside backing to get their messages across.114
Having said all of that, we still do not understand district attorney 
elections well; further research might help. 
Various strategies might overcome these electoral flaws.  Local 
television stations and newspapers could broadcast and print debates 
to showcase the candidates.  Term limits and campaign-finance re-
form, such as public financing, could make races more competitive.115
Synchronizing prosecutorial elections with presidential elections 
would increase voter turnout, though at the risk of drowning out local 
races with national ones. 
111 See Gonnerman, supra note 102 (describing David Soares’s campaign success as 
based solely on his argument that the incumbent did not support reform of harsh drug 
laws). 
112 See Jonathan P. Hicks, Steady Work, If You Can Get It, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2005, 
at 33 (explaining that no New York City district attorney has lost a reelection battle in 
the last fifty years, in part because district attorneys enjoy many opportunities to stage 
dramatic press conferences announcing arrests or indictments). 
113 Id.
114 See Roy B. Flemming, The Political Styles and Organizational Strategies of American 
Prosecutors:  Examples from Nine Courthouse Communities, 12 LAW & POL’Y 25, 28 (1990) (not-
ing an example of a challenger who won a narrow victory at considerable personal ex-
pense); Gonnerman, supra note 102 (reporting that money from billionaire George So-
ros’s drug-legalization group helped fund the Albany challenger’s successful campaign). 
115 The empirical evidence is inconclusive as to how well these measures work in 
other contexts.  One study, for example, found that state legislative term limits de-
creased state legislatures’ professionalism, institutional memory, and innovation, in 
part because their legislative sessions and time horizons may be too short.  THAD 
KOUSSER, TERM LIMITS AND THE DISMANTLING OF STATE LEGISLATIVE PROFESSIONALISM 
203-13 (2005). Lengthening each electoral term could mitigate these problems.  An-
other study found that contribution limits reduce incumbents’ margins of victory and 
increase the chances that they will decide not to run for reelection.  Thomas Strat-
mann & Francisco J. Aparicio-Castillo, Competition Policy for Elections:  Do Campaign Con-
tribution Limits Matter ?, 127 PUB. CHOICE 177, 194, 199 (2006). 
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Better information might also help voters to monitor their 
agents.116  Case-processing statistics alone might not matter much, for 
the reasons suggested above.  One could also solicit, compile, and 
publish regular performance evaluations of head prosecutors.  Fellow 
prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, defendants, victims, and jurors 
could routinely submit anonymous numerical and qualitative feed-
back on head and line prosecutors’ performance.  These question-
naires would solicit both broad narrative commentary and structured, 
focused ratings of prosecutors’ behavior.  Topics could include thor-
oughness of legal and factual investigation and preparation, diligence, 
promptness, candor, information and participation accorded to vic-
tims, and willingness to listen to opposing arguments and evidence.  
Publishing these data annually would give media and challengers con-
crete benchmarks by which to critique an office’s performance, as well 
as constructive guidance on how to improve it.  The feedback loop 
would also remedy the extreme narrowness of conviction statistics by 
broadening evaluations to reflect the input of all participants.  Victim 
satisfaction, for example, is nearly invisible to voters today, but these 
surveys could make it a salient campaign issue.  If most of the evalua-
tions were positive, voters would discount the grumbling of a few de-
fendants and defense lawyers as par for the adversarial course.  (A 
computer algorithm could do the same thing, weeding out outlier 
comments and those from sources who themselves have poor reputa-
tions in surveys.117)  If, however, the evaluations flagged persistent 
problems, district attorneys would face visible pressure to respond to 
criticisms or else lose their jobs at the next election.  They would be 
responsible for improving their subordinates’ performance, much as 
116 Laws modeled on the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006), or 
the Government in the Sunshine Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b, could increase public scrutiny.  
Such laws might not do much, however, as prosecutors would have to redact much to 
protect witnesses and mask private details. 
117 For example, eBay successfully uses such an algorithm to weight reputational 
feedback left by buyers and sellers.  For literature that discusses the value of online 
feedback and ways to counteract unfair and discriminatory ratings, see, for example, 
Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Building Trust Online:  The Design of Robust Reputation Reporting 
Mechanisms for Online Trading Communities, in SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 
IN THE DIGITAL ERA 95 (Georgios Doukidis et al. eds., 2004); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, 
The Digitization of Word of Mouth:  Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms, 49 
MGMT. SCI. 1407 (2003); Chrysanthos Dellarocas, Immunizing Online Reputation Report-
ing Systems Against Unfair Ratings and Discriminatory Behavior, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
2ND ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 150 (2000); Chrysanthos Dellaro-
cas, Reputation Mechanism Design in Online Trading Environments with Pure Moral Hazard,
16 INFO. SYS. RES. 209 (2005); Cynthia G. McDonald & V. Carlos Slawson, Jr., Reputa-
tion in an Internet Auction Market, 40 ECON. INQUIRY 633 (2002). 
990 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 959
corporate managers take credit or blame for their firms’ productivity 
and share prices.  These pressures would better align district attor-
neys’ interests with their constituents’ desires, leading them to maxi-
mize the range of goods desired by voters. 
More radical changes would give the public greater participatory 
rights in criminal justice beyond simple voting.  As I have suggested 
elsewhere, citizens could serve for a few weeks at a time as citizen ad-
vocates within prosecutors’ offices.118  In that capacity, prosecutors 
would have to consult with them about charging and disposing of 
cases, though they would have no veto.  This idea might be too costly 
and time consuming to replicate on any large scale.  Nevertheless, 
some form of consultation could inject community views into the most 
important prosecutorial policy decisions.  Doing so would also build 
community trust and rapport, much as sharing information and solic-
iting input from neighborhood groups help police to gain neighbor-
hood trust and cooperation.119  Though these changes might not be 
workable, if they did work they would help to keep prosecutors in line 
with the public’s concerns. 
One might fear that the last thing our criminal justice system 
needs is more populism.  Voters often seem to be reflexively punitive, 
and more democracy might seem to lead to more overpunishment.  
While understandable, this concern is overblown.  First, the public is 
not always as punitive as one might think.  In recent years, drug courts 
and similar criminal justice alternatives have flourished, reflecting the 
public’s willingness to soften enforcement.  Political branches have 
fought discrimination in police stops and capital punishment, reflect-
ing voters’ willingness to scrutinize unfairness in law enforcement.120
Some jurisdictions, such as the Bronx and San Francisco, even support 
118 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 959-60 (discussing the potential benefits and limits of 
using citizen advocates as a way to include the public in criminal justice decisions). 
119 See id.  In this respect, we could do far better than the much-ballyhooed com-
munity-prosecution movement, which seeks to work more closely with local police as 
well as public and private organizations to prevent crime and serve other community 
needs.  In practice, community prosecution has neither made prosecutors more ac-
countable to ordinary citizens nor aligned prosecutors’ interests with the community’s 
interest. See Brian Forst, Prosecutors Discover the Community, 84 JUDICATURE 135, 135-36, 
141 (2000) (discussing how community-prosecution programs have failed to improve 
prosecution or advance the public interest by making prosecutors more connected and 
sensitive to the cultures and needs of the community). 
120 See, e.g., Clines, supra note 109; David Kocieniewski, Amid Pomp, McGreevey Signs 
Racial-Profiling Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at B5 (reporting that the New Jersey 
Governor signed a bill prohibiting racial profiling in response to public outcry after 
state troopers wounded three unarmed black and Hispanic men during a traffic stop). 
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district attorneys who openly oppose the death penalty.121  Second, 
sensational, unrepresentative media coverage at least exacerbates the 
public’s punitiveness.  Better information might soften this harshness.  
The public calls for raising sentences because it systematically under-
estimates average penalties; if it understood penalties better, it would 
think them high enough.122  Third, as noted earlier, enterprising can-
didates have succeeded in selling the public on priorities beyond 
maximizing convictions, such as restricting plea bargaining or soften-
ing drug enforcement.123  Finally, in a democracy, voters are prosecu-
tors’ principals.  They have the right to influence prosecutorial policy 
in their locale, even if their preferences deviate from prosecutors’ or 
yours or mine. 
B. Informing Victims and Letting Them Participate 
Though victims are loosely analogous to a corporation’s custom-
ers, they have almost none of the power that customers do.  Prosecu-
tors have a monopoly on criminal prosecution, and they receive a 
fixed amount of funding and salary from the state.  Victims have no 
monetary leverage.  Nor do victims have much information.  Prosecu-
tors may tell them little about the evidence in their cases, for telling 
them too much might amount to witness coaching and compromise 
victims’ usefulness at trial.  Most victims cannot watch investigations, 
discovery, secret grand jury proceedings, plea negotiations, or most 
trial preparation.124  Even those court proceedings that are in theory 
open to the public are in practice poorly publicized.  While many laws 
give victims the right to notice of upcoming court proceedings, victims 
121 See Jan Hoffman, Prosecutor in Bronx, Under Fire, Softens Stand Against Executions,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 1996, at A1 (noting that voters had reelected the Bronx District 
Attorney despite his proclaimed opposition to the death penalty and that he remained 
generally opposed to it despite public criticism); Dean E. Murphy, Killing of Officer Stirs 
Death Penalty Debate, N.Y. TIMES,  June 12, 2004, at A7 (reporting that “[o]pinion polls 
show that San Franciscans overwhelmingly oppose the death penalty, and that in her 
winning campaign for district attorney last fall, Kamala D. Harris made no secret of her 
strong opposition as well,” and that despite furor over the killing of a San Francisco 
police officer, seventy percent of poll respondents supported her refusal to seek the 
death penalty in that case). 
122 See Bibas, supra note 5, at 927-29 (describing the results of studies that found 
that, when given concrete scenarios, laymen prefer sentences as low as or lower than 
those prescribed by statute or imposed by judges). 
123 See supra text accompanying notes 110-111. 
124 Bibas, supra note 5, at 923-24. 
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often do not receive notice or attend.125  When they do attend, they 
have little or no right to participate.  At most, they read victim-impact 
statements at sentencing or submit them ahead of time.126  Because 
victims are poorly informed and powerless, they are in no position to 
check or influence prosecutors. 
Victims could influence prosecutors much more effectively.  They 
already have knowledge about and incentives to invest in their own 
cases, so they will not automatically defer to prosecutors.127  Thus, in-
dividual victims are well positioned to discipline prosecutors in par-
ticular cases.  They could have rights to be heard and to consult with 
prosecutors about charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing deci-
sions.128  They need not have vetoes to be effective.  Prosecutors, deal-
ing with victims face to face, will heed their reasonable suggestions 
both out of empathy and out of concern for their reputations and re-
election prospects.129
Victims’ rights are controversial, however.  One common fear is 
that victims will be bloodthirsty and vengeful, demanding harsher 
punishments in every case.  This popular stereotype, however, is not 
accurate.  On the whole, victims are not primarily concerned with 
maximizing punishments.  What most victims want is information 
about their cases, a participatory role, fair and respectful treatment, 
emotional healing, apologies, and restitution.130  Currently, prosecu-
tors view their jobs as maximizing convictions, not delivering these 
other goods to victims. 
125 See PEGGY M. TOBOLOWSKY, CRIME VICTIM RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 36-39 (2001) 
(surveying various statistical studies of victim notification); Stephanos Bibas & Richard 
A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 
136-37 (2004) (noting that while many victims report wanting more information about 
their cases, many never have the opportunity to discuss their case with prosecutors or 
receive information about their rights). 
126 Bibas, supra note 5, at 930; Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 125, at 99-100. 
127 For development of these points at greater length, see Bibas, supra note 5, at 963. 
128 Id. at 954-55. 
129 Cf. JEANNINE BELL, POLICING HATRED 128-29 (2002) (describing how “seeing 
victims’ pain in its entirety . . . changed the officers’ worldview” to one of empathy with 
victims and showing how office culture fostered conversion). 
130 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 125, at 136-39 (collecting empirical evi-
dence on victim’s desires); Edna Erez, Victim Voice, Impact Statements and Sentencing:  In-
tegrating Restorative Justice and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Principles in Adversarial Proceedings,
40 CRIM. L. BULL. 483, 491-93 (“[R]esearch suggests that victims’ interests or concerns 
relative to proceedings are not tantamount to imposing a severe sentence, but pertain 
to the court addressing a broad range of issues. . . .”). 
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A more substantial fear is that prosecutors would give more weight 
to victims who are white, female, attractive, intelligent, articulate, edu-
cated, and well-to-do.131  In part, prosecutors may be biased or may re-
flect the anticipated biases of judges and juries.  In part, educated, 
prosperous victims and communities may lobby prosecutors harder, 
and hold more political clout, than poor residents of slums.  Criminal 
justice may already underprotect minorities and the poor, and too 
much of a role for victims might exacerbate the problem.  While these 
concerns are legitimate, an awareness of them might help prosecutors 
to guard against these biases.  Moreover, rich, articulate victims al-
ready find ways to exercise this influence informally in the status quo.  
Creating formal avenues for participation might level the playing field 
by empowering otherwise disempowered victims, helping them to 
heal, and equalizing outcomes.132
Giving victims a greater role as stakeholders would also shift 
prosecutors’ priorities away from so-called victimless crimes towards 
classic violent and property crimes.  This shift would not be costless, as 
so-called victimless crimes often spread diffuse, but noticeable, harms 
131 See, e.g., DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 149-
58 (1990) (reporting that victim’s race, sex, and socioeconomic status all significantly 
affect the likelihood that the defendant will be sentenced to death, but positing that 
victim’s sex is a proxy for women’s greater physical vulnerability); RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 69-75 (1997) (discussing how criminal justice underpro-
tects black victims); David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Admini-
stration of the Death Penalty:  A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience 
(1973–1999), 81 NEB. L. REV. 486, 608-23, 619 n.279 (2002) (finding a statistically sig-
nificant effect of victim’s socioeconomic status on the imposition of the death penalty 
in Nebraska and attributing this effect to victims’ families’ ability to lobby prosecutors 
and deliver articulate victim-impact statements); David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimi-
nation and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era:  An Empirical and Legal Overview, with 
Recent Findings from Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638, 1658-60, 1715 & n.144 
(1998) (surveying evidence that killers of white victims are more likely to be charged 
with capital crimes and sentenced to death, and reporting evidence from Philadelphia 
that killers of low-socioeconomic-status victims are significantly less likely to receive the 
death penalty as a result of both prosecutorial and jury decisions); Norbert L. Kerr, 
Beautiful and Blameless:  Effects of Victim Attractiveness and Responsibility on Mock Jurors’ Ver-
dicts, 4 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 479, 480-81 (1978) (finding that mock ju-
rors were more likely to convict defendants whose victims are attractive).  But see
Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race, Socioeconomic 
Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock Jurors:  A Meta-Analysis,
24 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1315, 1325, 1327, 1330 tbl.5 (1994) (meta-analyzing pre-
vious research and finding that victims’ physical attractiveness and socioeconomic 
status do not significantly affect jurors’ judgments, though victims’ sex does and vic-
tims’ race has a small effect on punishment). 
132 See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 125, at 138 (collecting empirical evidence 
that victims’ rights laws have this effect). 
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across a neighborhood.  Neighborhood residents face a collective-
action problem, making it harder for them to organize and influence 
prosecutors than for a few victims who have suffered grave harm.  
Nonetheless, this enforcement shift might be welcome.  As a matter of 
distributive justice, it is more important to focus on palpably wronged 
victims of violent and property crime.  Having suffered most acutely, 
they need healing most. 
Victims exert influence case by case, so they are not as able to 
weigh or influence broad policy as voters are.  Nevertheless, victims 
play an important role that legislatures, courts, and bar authorities 
cannot.  The latter bodies review prosecutorial action or harshness but 
are virtually powerless in the face of inaction or leniency.  Victims can 
fill this gap, scrutinizing prosecutorial declinations and concessions 
and forcing prosecutors to provide reasons for their actions.  In addi-
tion, unlike legislatures, courts, and bar authorities, victims are inde-
pendently familiar with their own cases, so they are best able to keep 
prosecutors honest.  As stakeholders, victims have an essential role to 
play in keeping their agents in line. 
C. Giving Defendants Appropriate Voice 
It may sound odd to treat defendants as stakeholders who should 
influence prosecutors’ decisions.  After all, we usually think of prose-
cutors and defendants as locked in adversarial combat, pursuing dia-
metrically opposed goals.  Most defendants want to avoid conviction 
and punishment, yet we do not expect prosecutors to honor that self-
serving desire. 
Yet prosecutors are not mere partisan advocates, but officers of 
the court.  They are sworn to pursue justice, not just to maximize con-
victions and sentences.  Pursuing justice includes considering defen-
dants as human beings who deserve fair, respectful treatment and 
sometimes mercy. 
Right now, most defendants’ voices are inaudible.  Most are poor, 
uneducated, and politically powerless.  Most cannot afford high-
priced private counsel but must instead content themselves with over-
worked appointed counsel.  And our system systematically silences 
criminal defendants by minimizing and scripting their own speaking 
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roles and instead having defense counsel speak for them.133  Head 
prosecutors and the public have no way to learn of defendants’ views, 
let alone to sift out feedback that might reflect on prosecutors’ per-
formance.
If defendants are to have a voice in the system, we need ways to 
separate their reflections on the quality of prosecutorial behavior 
from their raw desires for leniency.  Likewise, defense lawyers’ views 
are relevant to the extent that they reflect on how a prosecutor does 
his job and not simply his toughness. 
Fortunately, when defendants and defense counsel praise or 
blame prosecutors, they already draw these distinctions.  Defendants 
and defense lawyers do not seem to blame prosecutors for doing their 
jobs.  Indeed, they may speak admiringly of prosecutors as tough but 
fair.134  What they will blame prosecutors for is bias, arbitrariness, or 
procedural injustices such as rudeness, misrepresentation, or unethi-
cal conduct.  This observation accords with Tom Tyler’s findings that 
litigants care not only about substantive outcomes, but also about 
whether the system has treated them fairly.135
The reputational surveys and feedback suggested earlier would 
give defendants and defense counsel such a voice.  Defendants and 
defense counsel are valuable sources of information about prosecuto-
rial behavior, ones that we have not tapped well.  Computer algo-
rithms could compare the specific complaints leveled against one 
prosecutor with those leveled against others, discarding outlier survey 
133 See Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless:  The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1449, 1451 (2005) (discussing the “silencing phenomenon” and its “systematic 
implications for the integrity of the justice process”). 
134 See, e.g., Ian Berry, Waltz Prosecutor Called Tough, but Fair, CHATTANOOGA TIMES 
FREE PRESS, Sept. 19, 2005, at B1; Dan Eggen, Second-in-Command at Justice to Depart,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 2005, at A21 (“[Deputy Attorney General] Comey earned fre-
quent praise from colleagues, and even some foes, as a tough but fair prosecu-
tor . . . .”); Kirk Makin, Morin Informant Named Dangerous Offender, GLOBE & MAIL
(Can.), Oct. 4, 2007, at A7 (describing a Crown counsel “respected by the defence bar 
for being tough, but fair”); Shannon McCaffrey, Prosecutor Known as Tough but Fair 
Takes Lead at Justice, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 12, 2003, at A21 (noting that not only did 
defense lawyers praise James Comey “as a tough but fair prosecutor’s prosecutor,” but 
even a mob assassin whom he was trying to imprison slipped him a note at trial that 
read, “‘You’re a class act . . . . No one deserves that [lawyer-of-the-year] award more 
than you do’”); David Schaper, Morning Edition:  Senate Panel Sets Deadline on Corruption 
Case (NPR radio broadcast Apr. 13, 2007), available at http://www.npr.org/ 
templates/story/story/ph?storyid=9564617 (noting Milwaukee U.S. Attorney Steve 
Biskupic’s reputation as tough but fair). 
135 See LIND & TYLER, supra note 86, at 76-81, 106, 208, 215; TYLER, supra note 85, at 
94-108. 
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responses and flagging outlier prosecutors.  Head prosecutors and 
voters would dismiss the occasional griping of a defendant or defense 
lawyer who felt he deserved a lighter sentence.  A pattern of specific, 
corroborated complaints could push head prosecutors to watch, train, 
discipline, or fire outlier prosecutors and push voters to punish head 
prosecutors who failed to do so.  Knowing that they are being watched 
and evaluated, line prosecutors might rein in their excesses and take 
greater pains to administer consistent, impartial justice fairly and  
respectfully. 
III. INTERNAL GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS
Pressure from voters, victims, and defendants can influence 
prosecutors, particularly head prosecutors who care about reelection.  
These pressures align head prosecutors’ interests and values with 
those of their principals, the stakeholders.  In other words, head 
prosecutors need to change, and stakeholders can help to change 
them.  Head prosecutors must then work to translate stakeholders’ in-
terests and values into practice.  Sometimes, empathy with victims and 
defendants may be enough to influence line prosecutors without fur-
ther prodding from above.  Line prosecutors, however, also serve their 
own strong self-interests in racking up marketable win-loss records, 
making names for themselves, and lightening their own workloads.136
Head prosecutors do not share these interests to the same extent.137
They care more about broader, systemic values such as equal treat-
ment and general deterrence.  Thus, head prosecutors must do more 
to check line prosecutors’ self-interests and bring them into line with 
stakeholders’ values and interests. 
Head prosecutors have many different tools that they can use for 
this task.  This Part draws on management literature to explore the 
different tools that head prosecutors could use to shape their offices’ 
work.  Section A begins by discussing the importance of office culture, 
ideals, and norms.  Section B considers the importance of the struc-
ture of prosecutors’ offices.  Section C examines how internal substan-
tive and procedural office policies make line prosecutors more consis-
tent and accountable.  Section D addresses how hiring, firing, 
136 See Bibas, supra note 7, at 2470-76 (detailing the agency costs of prosecutors’ 
incentives and pressures); see also JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE
154 (1991) (reporting that trial prosecutors in three jurisdictions studied were moti-
vated not to lose cases, particularly jury trials). 
137 See Bibas, supra note 7, at 2541-42. 
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promotion, and training shape a prosecutorial office.  Section E dis-
cusses how data gathering, performance evaluations, feedback, and 
incentives could improve performance.  One consistent theme is that 
prosecutors, like many government agencies, have been too slow to 
use information technology to help make their offices more transpar-
ent, consistent, and accountable. 
A.  Prosecutorial Office Culture 
Perhaps the most potent regulatory force is one that is easy to 
overlook:  the ethos or professional culture of a prosecutor’s office.  
Maybe we should ask not why a minority of prosecutors commit mis-
conduct, but why the majority are relatively clean, at least as far as the 
public can tell.  Maybe the question is not so much why prosecutors 
shirk and create inequities by indulging their self-interests, but why 
they do not indulge these temptations completely.  How is it that 
prosecutors’ internal mores, shared values, and socialization guide 
and constrain them to serve stakeholders? 
The process may begin in law school or earlier, as law students 
learn that the job of the prosecutor is to do justice, not just to convict.  
While budding litigators are socialized into an adversarial system that 
exalts combat and client loyalty, one hopes that they continue to value 
justice, fairness, and diligence as well.  Judicial opinions, legislative 
enactments, and ethical canons can transmit and reinforce norms, 
particularly if they are well publicized. 
Prosecutors’ offices must continue to inculcate and reinforce 
these values, much as successful corporations do.  Successful firms 
stress the need to adapt continually to serve customers, stockholders, 
and employees fairly and with integrity.138  The same logic applies to 
prosecutors’ serving their own stakeholders. 
Head and supervisory prosecutors play important roles in shaping 
and communicating office culture and socializing line prosecutors 
into that culture.  As the management literature reports, managers in 
successful, adaptive firms deeply value stockholders, customers, and 
138 See JOHN P. KOTTER & JAMES L. HESKETT, CORPORATE CULTURE AND PERFORM-
ANCE 32-33 exhibit 3.1, 47-55, 49 exhibit 4.2 (1992) (reporting empirical evidence that 
twelve higher-performing firms consistently valued customers, stockholders, and employ-
ees more than ten comparable lower-performing firms in matching industries, and re-
porting causal evidence that managers who value leadership and care greatly about serv-
ing stakeholders lead their firms to adapt to changing needs); see also THOMAS J. PETERS 
& ROBERT H. WATERMAN, JR., IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE 156-99, 319 (1982) (stressing 
that a strong focus on serving customers makes firms adapt to serve their needs). 
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employees.139  They are expected to lead initiatives designed to serve 
these stakeholders’ needs.140  Conversely, firms that do not value lead-
ership and stakeholders ignore important information and feedback 
and fail to adapt.141
Culture is deeply embedded in existing organizations.  Because 
there is so much inertia to overcome, cultural change must start from 
the top down, not the bottom up.142  To change these silent assump-
tions and values, leaders must bring them to the surface and analyze 
or challenge them, much as cognitive therapists do.143  Sometimes 
change happens through evolution, but more mature organizations 
may need a sense of crisis to motivate revolutionary change.144  Particu-
larly in the latter case, strong leadership is necessary to guide firms 
through risky, often painful, anxiety-provoking changes.145
Leaders who have climbed the organizational ladder may be too 
steeped in an organization’s existing culture to critique and improve 
it.  Thus, leaders recruited from outside or who have outsiders’ per-
spectives are better able to reform mature firms’ cultures.146  Change 
takes time, from four years at medium-sized firms to ten years at huge 
firms, so short leadership terms may thwart change.147  The same ob-
servations hold true of prosecutors’ offices.  Short-term prosecutors 
have little hope of changing the local courthouse culture and way of 
doing things.148  District attorneys who win office as insurgent outsid-
ers enjoy powerful mandates and are more successful at implementing 
139 KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 138, at 51 exhibit 4.3. 
140 See id. at 50 (italicizing this point for emphasis). 
141 Id. at 70-72, 73 exhibit 6.3. 
142 Id. at 92-93. 
143 See RALPH H. KILMANN, MANAGING BEYOND THE QUICK FIX 49-72 (1989); EDGAR 
H. SCHEIN, ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE AND LEADERSHIP 278-79, 306-07 (1985). 
144 SCHEIN, supra note 143, at 281-82. 
145 Id. at 323-24. 
146 Id. at 321-22.  One empirical study found that of eleven corporate heads who 
successfully led major cultural change at high-performing corporations, five were re-
cruited directly from outside.  Two had come from outside the firm earlier in their ca-
reers after substantial careers elsewhere.  The remaining four had unconventional in-
side career paths.  Not one was a traditional insider.  See KOTTER & HESKETT, supra
note 138, at 89-92 (noting, however, that complete outsiders may lack “credibility, rela-
tionships, and [the] power base” needed to turn around extremely large companies). 
147 KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 138, at 104-05, 110. 
148 See PETER F. NARDULLI ET AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE 128 (1988) (explaining 
that courthouse culture and values are so deeply embedded that “[t]ransient interlop-
ers ensconced in powerful positions for short periods of time . . . are normally little 
more than blips in a court community’s history”). 
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changes.  They are particularly successful if they have campaigned on 
platforms promising specific reforms.149  Prosecutorial elections could 
incorporate these lessons.  They could select for outsiders by imposing 
term limits, disqualifying current employees of the particular prosecu-
tors’ office, or requiring some years’ experience in criminal defense, 
another prosecutor’s office, or private practice.150  They could also 
guarantee sufficient time for change by lengthening district attorneys’ 
terms to six or even eight years. 
Successful managers often begin by instilling a sense of crisis, 
gathering the data necessary to show the need to improve.  Marshal-
ling information lays the foundation for needed reforms.151  These 
leaders communicate their vision and values through repeated words 
and deeds, engaging in frequent dialogue with subordinates and prac-
ticing what they preach.152  For example, subordinates notice what 
their leaders consistently observe, ask about, measure, control, and 
reward.153  They watch how their leaders react to crises.154  They learn 
by listening as their superiors teach, coach, and serve as role models.155
They are shaped by hiring, firing, pay, and promotion policies, both 
because leaders select suitable people and because employees con-
form to these expectations to get ahead.156  Secondarily, employees are 
also influenced by an organization’s structure, procedures, physical 
layout, folklore, and mission statement.157
149 See Flemming, supra note 114, at 28-33 (describing three examples in which 
electoral challengers succeeded in enacting reforms); cf. id. at 38 (noting that incum-
bent’s electoral power and political clout play large roles in inducing underlings to fol-
low their leader). 
150 Politicians could take these same lessons to heart in appointive systems, making 
a point of hiring outsiders to clean house.  See, e.g., John Kass, U.S. Attorney’s Independence 
Pays Dividends, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 21, 2003, § 1, at 2 (reporting that an Illinois senator 
made a point of selecting Patrick Fitzgerald, an outsider, as U.S. Attorney, because his 
lack of political ties to anyone in Illinois freed him to pursue public-corruption cases). 
151 JOHN P. KOTTER & DAN S. COHEN, THE HEART OF CHANGE 15-36 (2002); KOT-
TER & HESKETT, supra note 138, at 94-96. 
152 KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 138, at 94-96. 
153 SCHEIN, supra note 143, at 224-30. 
154 Id. at 230-32. 
155 Id. at 232-33; see also ALFRED P. SLOAN, JR., MY YEARS WITH GENERAL MOTORS
433 ( John McDonald & Catharine Stevens eds., 1964) (emphasizing the need to sell 
major proposals to the affected parts of a company); JACK WELCH, JACK 393 (2001) 
(stressing the importance of a CEO’s constant cheerleading and reiterating ideas and 
initiatives to persuade and lead subordinates). 
156 SCHEIN, supra note 143, at 233-37. 
157 Id. at 237-42. 
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I will have more to say about the tangible measures listed above in 
the following Sections.  For now, I want to note how less tangible lead-
ership can define prosecutors’ mission as service to stakeholders.  Cul-
ture is not easy to gauge from the outside, let alone regulate, but char-
ismatic leadership can lead to change.  District attorneys who have 
enough outside perspective to avoid complacency can communicate a 
sense of crisis and spur improvement.  District attorneys who repeat-
edly mention voters’ and victims’ concerns and discourage bragging 
about win-loss records can communicate these priorities to their sub-
ordinates.  They can likewise send messages by using computers to 
track and publish crime rates, citizen complaints, and defense feed-
back, not just conviction statistics.  District attorneys who award high 
status and a big office to the office ethics maven and funnel queries to 
him underscore the importance of ethical conduct.  District attorneys 
who teach, cheerlead, and regale underlings with war stories and mis-
sion statements inculcate their priorities.  Young attorneys, impres-
sionable and eager to emulate their superiors, take their cues from this 
rhetorical leadership.  In short, rhetoric from the top matters. 
B. The Structure of Prosecutors’ Offices 
Prosecutorial office structure greatly influences how much head 
prosecutors can supervise, oversee, and control their subordinates.  As 
noted earlier, most district attorneys are locally elected at the county, 
district, or circuit level.158  In Alaska, Delaware, and Rhode Island, the 
attorney general has primary responsibility for prosecutions through-
out the state.159  In Connecticut, the attorney general appoints state’s 
attorneys, while in New Jersey, the governor appoints county prosecu-
tors.160  The statewide hierarchies enabled Alaska’s attorney general to 
ban plea bargaining for a time and New Jersey’s attorney general to 
regulate charging decisions.  As Dan Richman suggests, these unusual 
structures can create direct control and political accountability, pro-
moting consistent enforcement of statewide laws.161  The Department 
158 See supra text accompanying note 91. 
159 DeFrances, supra note 91, app.; Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 732 n.91 (1996) (citing statutes from Alaska, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Delaware). 
160 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158-1 (West 1985); DeFrances, supra note 91, app.; Misner, 
supra note 159, at 732 & n.91. 
161 See Richman, supra note 79, at 2062-64 (noting that when later attorneys general 
of Alaska allowed local discretion to increase to the point that the plea-bargaining ban 
decayed, line attorneys complained of “[in]sufficient policy guidance from above”). 
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of Justice plays the same role in regulating federal prosecutors across 
the country.162  Intuitively, hierarchical structures are appealing ways 
to ensure consistency and service to stakeholders, but further research 
is needed into how well they work in practice.  Perhaps large states 
cannot replicate these smaller states’ centralization, but they could at 
least head in that direction. 
Even within a local office, structure matters.  Many prosecutors’ 
offices drift along without centralized leadership or a hierarchical 
structure, which impedes monitoring of subordinates.  Line prosecu-
tors in these offices remain free to do what they wish and ignore office 
policies and stakeholders’ interests.163  In contrast, centralized leader-
ship, hierarchy, and monitoring aid consistency in all but the smallest 
prosecutors’ offices.  Supervisors help to implement district attorneys’ 
policies.  Head prosecutors who want to increase sentences can cen-
tralize review and approval of plea bargains.164  Those who want to in-
crease efficiency or prevent later charge reductions can aggressively 
screen out weak cases.165  Centralized charging units, staffed by prose-
cutors who will not try the cases themselves, eliminate prosecutors’ 
self-interest in overcharging weak cases so that they can later charge-
bargain them away.166  Computer tracking and frequent statistical re-
162 See Memorandum from John Ashcroft, U.S. Attorney Gen., to All Fed. Prosecu-
tors (Sept. 22, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/ 
03_ag_516.htm (establishing uniform substantive and procedural standards limiting 
federal prosecutors’ plea bargaining).  It is unclear, however, how effective this memo-
randum has been.  See G. Jack King, Jr., NACDL Survey:  USAOs Deny Ashcroft Memo Af-
fecting Plea Bargaining, CHAMPION, Dec. 2003, at 6 (reporting, based on a telephone 
survey of United States Attorney’s Offices, that the Ashcroft Memorandum had not 
changed local practices). 
163 E.g., EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 136, at 86; Flemming, supra note 114, at 
39, 40 tbl.1, 45-46. 
164 See, e.g., EISENSTEIN & JACOB, supra note 136, at 151 (giving the example of the 
Detroit prosecutor’s office); Flemming, supra note 114, at 41-42, 44 (discussing the ef-
fects of tighter control). 
165 See, e.g., Flemming, supra note 114, at 44 (noting one county’s aggressive 
screening); Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 61-82 (discussing the example of New 
Orleans).
166 See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 61-82 (presenting empirical evidence 
that centralized screening units greatly reduced charge bargaining in New Orleans).  
This model of dividing up cases by stage is sometimes called horizontal prosecution, as 
opposed to vertical prosecution, in which the same prosecutor handles a case from in-
take through sentencing and appeal.  See, e.g., NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 148, at 190 
(explaining that a system of vertical prosecution enabled line prosecutors to grant 
concessions and bargain away cases with almost no supervision).  Rachel Barkow makes 
the same point, analogizing this prosecutorial structure to the separation of functions 
within administrative agencies.  Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of 
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ports can reinforce oversight and implementation of district attorneys’ 
priorities.167
In this respect, my recommendations seem to run counter to the 
management literature.  Much management literature bemoans ex-
cessive corporate hierarchies and praises the recent trend toward flat-
tening and slimming layers of bureaucracy.168  But organizations need 
centralized coordination as well as decentralization.169  General Elec-
tric, for example, became leaner and more flexible by slimming down 
from twenty-nine to six levels.170  Sizable corporations retain some hi-
erarchy, because lower-level agents need supervision by top agents to 
make sure everyone is serving shareholders and customers.171  In con-
trast, prosecutors’ offices have nowhere near six levels of review.  
Many prosecutors’ offices are at the other extreme of the spectrum, 
with virtually no effective oversight in most cases.  Rather than being 
regulated to death, even line prosecutors express frustration with the 
lack of coordination.172  Because the problem is the opposite one, the 
solution is as well. 
Prosecutors:  Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009) (advocating 
that charging, plea acceptance, and substantial-assistance determinations be made by 
separate prosecutors or panels of prosecutors). 
167 See, e.g., Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, “The Wisdom We Have Lost”:  Sentenc-
ing Information and Its Uses, 58 STAN. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (2005) (noting that collecting 
and disseminating sentencing data can democratize the process, facilitating input from 
a broader array of actors and so improving policy); Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 
65-66 (noting District Attorney Connick’s maxim, “If you can’t measure it, you can’t 
manage it” and that data both facilitate supervision and keep line prosecutors mindful 
that supervisors monitor their actions). 
168 See, e.g., PETER F. DRUCKER, THE PRACTICE OF MANAGEMENT 203 (1954) (stress-
ing “that the organization structure [should] contain the least possible number of manage-
ment levels, and forge the shortest possible chain of command”); KOTTER & HESKETT,
supra note 138, at 99 (reporting that decentralization and cutting bureaucracy were 
important elements in ten cases of successful cultural change); WELCH, supra note 155, 
at 383-84 (noting that “[b]ureaucracy strangles” whereas “[i]nformality liberates” and 
encourages information and ideas to flow freely to the top). 
169 SLOAN, supra note 155, at 429-35; see also PETER F. DRUCKER, CONCEPT OF THE 
CORPORATION 115-29 (Transaction Publishers 1993) (1946) (holding up General Mo-
tors as a model of decentralization blended with central oversight). 
170 See JANET C. LOWE, JACK WELCH SPEAKS 119-22 (1998). 
171 See Elliott Jaques, In Praise of Hierarchy, in MANAGING PEOPLE AND ORGANIZA-
TIONS 382, 385-92 ( John J. Gabarro ed., 1992) (explaining that hierarchical manage-
ment adds value, promotes accountability, and reflects broader perspective of those 
with longer time horizons who confront more complex problems, and reporting that 
for all but the largest corporations, seven levels of hierarchy is enough). 
172 See, e.g., Flemming, supra note 114, at 46. 
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C. Prosecutors’ Internal Office Policies 
Section I.B suggested that judges have neither the expertise nor 
the inclination nor the ability to write rules for prosecutors.  Some ob-
servers jump from this problem to conclude that writing rules to con-
strain prosecutors is hopeless.173  In a series of works, however, Ronald 
Wright and Marc Miller argue powerfully that prosecutorial self-
regulation can and does work well.  In other words, head prosecutors 
can align their subordinates’ actions with principals’ interests by writ-
ing down and enforcing procedural and substantive office policies.  
Indeed, more transparency will lead voters and victims to clamor for 
these kinds of rules, and head prosecutors can respond and imple-
ment them effectively.  For example, at the direction of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, the state attorney general promulgated statewide 
charging guidelines for enhanced drug penalties.174  Prosecutors must 
explain why they are or are not seeking enhanced sentences, and trial 
judges review these reasons to police compliance with the guide-
lines.175  After receiving feedback from courts, the guidelines devel-
oped into something like sentencing guidelines, with offense and of-
fender criteria for higher and lower plea offers and guidance on 
departures.176  New Jersey courts have likewise prompted prosecutors 
173 See David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 
CRIME & JUST. 71, 122 (2001) (rejecting prosecutorial guidelines and explaining that 
“[t]he myriad factors that influence a judgment related to likely conviction of a par-
ticular crime or crimes, to say nothing of their relative weights, involves polycentric 
decision making not readily susceptible to judicial review” and that “there is no mean-
ingful external standard against which to measure the subjective discretionary deci-
sion”); see also LIEF H. CARTER, THE LIMITS OF ORDER 11-14, 113-50 (1974) (suggesting 
that achieving consistency through internal rules and procedures is impossible, based 
on both theoretical literature and case studies of specific kinds of organizations, in-
cluding a California prosecutor’s office); ARTHUR ROSETT & DONALD R. CRESSEY, JUS-
TICE BY CONSENT 161-72 (1976) (arguing that discretion is inevitable and cannot be 
confined by judicial procedural rules); Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecu-
tor:  A Conceptual Framework, 15 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 255 (1988) (endorsing Carter’s ar-
gument “that prosecutorial decision making is inherently uncontrollable by preor-
dained rules and guidelines”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary 
System, 1992 BYU L. REV. 669, 674-75 (arguing that there is a category of factors on 
which prosecutors must rely that do not “lend themselves to . . . systematization” and 
that “this type of [case-specific] discretion is not only inevitable, but also desirable”). 
174 Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of Prosecutorial Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1010, 1031 (2005). 
175 Id.
176 See id. at 1031-32 (describing the guidelines drafters’ use of judicial sentencing 
guidelines as a model in order to develop guidelines that would be more consistent 
across counties, as the court directed); see also Ronald F. Wright, Prosecutorial Guidelines 
and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1087, 1093-97 (2005) (tracking 
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to draft guidelines regulating pre-trial diversion and the filing of capi-
tal charges.177  The state legislature has directed the attorney general 
to draft guidelines structuring prosecutors’ decisions to proceed in ju-
venile or adult court.178  And the attorney general, on his own initia-
tive, has drafted guidelines to harmonize decisions about when to seek 
collateral sanctions.179
Other states’ prosecutors have regulated themselves as well.  The 
New Orleans District Attorney’s Office used centralized screening, 
close supervisory review, and information technology to restrict over-
charging and plea bargaining.  By doing so, District Attorney Harry 
Connick, Sr., fulfilled his campaign pledge to crack down on plea 
bargaining.180  In Florida, state legislators complained that prosecutors 
were discriminating and being arbitrary in deciding which habitual 
offenders deserved habitual-offender charges.  To head off legislative 
restrictions, Florida’s state attorneys banded together to promulgate 
guidelines and criteria for filing these charges.181  Other authors have 
noted that Alaska’s attorney general succeeded in more or less ban-
ning plea bargaining for a decade or more.182  In addition, the U.S. 
Department of Justice enforces various internal policies, such as the 
Petite policy barring successive prosecutions and limits on criminal 
RICO charges.183
the escalating demands of the New Jersey courts for stricter prosecutorial guidelines 
and pointing out the New Jersey Supreme Court’s decree that legal restrictions on the 
sentencing discretion of judges should apply equally to prosecutors). 
177 See Wright, supra note 176, at 1090-92 (pointing out the New Jersey courts’ role 
in creating a pre-trial intervention program); Wright, supra note 174, at 1034 (docu-
menting the gradual expansion of prosecutorial guidelines to cover more subjects). 
178 Wright, supra note 174, at 1034; see also Wright, supra note 176, at 1098 (noting 
that the legislature “took the hint from the supreme court”). 
179 Wright, supra note 176, at 1097; Wright, supra note 174, at 1034. 
180 See Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 61-66 (chronicling the steps that Connick 
took to direct more resources and expertise to reducing the use of plea bargains and 
to closely monitoring the reduction). 
181 See FLA. PROSECUTING ATTORNEYS’ ASS’N, STATEMENT CONCERNING IMPLEMENT-
ING OF HABITUAL DRUG LAWS (1993), as reprinted in MILLER & WRIGHT, supra note 41, at 
937-38 (setting forth nonbinding criteria to guide state attorneys in enforcing Florida’s 
habitual-offender laws). 
182 See Teresa White Carns & John Kruse, A Re-Evaluation of Alaska’s Plea Bargaining 
Ban, 8 ALASKA L. REV. 27, 32-40 (1991) (observing the profound impact of the Alaska 
Attorney General’s 1975 ban on plea bargaining). 
183 Cf. Norman Abrams, Internal Policy:  Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 
UCLA L. REV. 1, 14 (1971) (noting “a number of well-known instances where prosecu-
tors” seemed to adopt nonprosecution policies).  See generally Podgor, supra note 33 (dis-
cussing internal policies, violations of these policies, and efforts to improve compliance). 
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Notice the subtle interplay of judicial, legislative, and voter pres-
sure in New Jersey, New Orleans, and Florida.  These institutions may 
not be able to draft subtle rules themselves.  They can, nevertheless, 
prompt prosecutors to self-regulate and justify their own policy 
choices, and then police compliance with prosecutors’ own rules. 
These rules can develop in a variety of ways.  Kenneth Culp Davis 
and others suggest that prosecutors use Administrative Procedure Act-
type rulemaking to develop enforcement policies,184 but this approach 
is too rigid.185  Often, a series of prosecutorial decisions develops into 
a recognizable pattern that over time becomes an unwritten rule or 
presumption.  Richard Frase’s empirical study of one office, for ex-
ample, found that writing down reasons for decisions in individual 
cases is an important first step toward developing rules.186  Even with-
out specified rules or criteria, these written reasons begin to converge.  
Prosecutors may, for example, develop a shared sense that thefts of 
less than five hundred dollars usually do not merit federal prosecu-
tion, absent certain aggravating factors.  “[E]ven if the policy-
formulation process has not progressed to the stage of articulated fac-
tors, they may emerge from the process of reason giving; thus, reasons 
evolve into factors, and factors evolve into rules.”187  In some areas 
mandatory or at least presumptive rules are feasible, Frase’s study 
shows, while in others guidelines or factors are more workable.188
Dan Richman rightly suggests that hierarchy and centralization 
improve consistent, accountable application of rules.189  Recall that 
line prosecutors try to minimize their workloads and gain marketable 
184 See DAVIS, supra note 6, at 65-68, 202 (applauding the fairness, transparency, 
and efficiency of administrative rulemaking); cf. Charles P. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, 
Taming the Dragon:  An Administrative Law For Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 473, 490-91, 496-99 (1976) (recommending that prosecutors’ offices adopt 
rules and guidelines that turn on objective criteria to guide discretionary decisions). 
185 See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1396-1436 (1992) (discussing how even supposedly informal notice-
and-comment rulemaking has become cumbersome, discouraging agencies from 
promulgating new rules and revisiting old rules). 
186 See Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges:  A Quantitative 
Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REV. 246, 292-96 (1980) (discussing the vir-
tues and drawbacks of prosecutorial guidelines that require prosecutors to offer writ-
ten reasons subject to review for their discretionary decisions to charge). 
187 Id. at 294. 
188 See id. at 298 (“It is important . . . to recognize that there are several different 
types of rules, which differ in their utility as guiding and structuring mechanisms.”). 
189 See Richman, supra note 79, at 2062-73 (identifying Alaska and New Jersey as 
successful examples and to the federal system as a possibly less successful example). 
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experience, whereas head prosecutors are more concerned with 
stakeholders’ interests and preferences and with consistency.  Thus, 
substantive policies should go hand in hand with procedural ones that 
ensure supervision.  Requiring prosecutors to justify major decisions 
in writing, as Frase suggests, is the first step.  Simply having to explain 
and justify one’s decisions disciplines prosecutors, much as writing 
reasoned decisions disciplines judges.  Furthermore, written docu-
mentation and record keeping enable supervisors to review or at least 
spot-check their subordinates’ compliance with office policy, leading 
subordinates to self-police.  Documentation also makes possible a sys-
tem of informal appeals, allowing defense counsel to take their cases 
to supervisory prosecutors.  Well-connected defense lawyers already 
informally influence prosecutors’ decisions this way; procedural poli-
cies could regularize this avenue and guarantee less-connected de-
fense counsel equal access.190
For the most important decisions—such as whether to seek the 
death penalty—elaborate procedures, adversarial submissions, and  
review by a specialized panel can promote equality.191  Significant but 
less momentous decisions may require review by the head prosecutor 
or a designated supervisor or committee.  For example, U.S. Attor-
neys’ offices have policies that require review or approval for striking 
cooperation agreements and notifying courts of cooperation.  Most 
U.S. Attorneys’ offices have written policies requiring approval by the 
U.S. Attorney, a supervisory assistant, a review committee, or some 
combination of these.  Paper policies are not enough, however, if 
leaders do not expect and demand compliance.  In practice, fewer 
than half of U.S. Attorneys’ offices comply fully with their own coop-
eration policies, and at least a dozen do not comply at all.192  Leaders 
190 See Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2117, 2125-29, 2148-49 (1998) (describing how experienced defense lawyers al-
ready exert informal influence, at least in white-collar criminal cases, and proposing 
more formal review processes); cf. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§§ 320.1, 350.3 (1975) (proposing that prosecutors take part in precharge screening 
conferences with an appeals process and promulgate plea bargaining guidelines and 
regulations “designed to afford similarly situated defendants equal opportunities for 
plea discussions and plea agreements”). 
191 See Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty:  History and Some Thoughts About the 
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347, 440-502 (1999) (describing the 
workings of the U.S. Department of Justice’s centralized Capital Case Review Commit-
tee and its internal procedures for authorizing federal prosecutors to seek the death 
penalty).
192 See LINDA DRAZGA MAXFIELD & JOHN H. KRAMER, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N,
SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL YARDSTICK GAUGING EQUITY IN CURRENT 
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must formulate clear policies, follow them consistently, ferret out and 
penalize violations, and reward compliance.193  While government au-
dits can verify compliance, the pressure to comply must come from 
leaders who feel accountable to stakeholders. 
Though centralized prosecutorial hierarchies can more easily 
regulate themselves, less centralized prosecutorial systems, such as 
those of New Orleans and Florida, have succeeded in self-regulation.  
And while judges can review compliance with regulations, as Wright 
suggests, other pressures can work as well.  Notably, the Florida exam-
ple shows that publicizing enforcement policies and patterns can gen-
erate political pressure for internal consistency and reform.  Legisla-
tive oversight and direct public pressure can spur improvement.  
Transparency, in other words, can help stakeholders to monitor 
prosecutors’ performance and to push for more concrete policies.  
One could even go so far as to publish policy outlines and have candi-
dates for district attorney compete on their enforcement priorities 
given fixed budgets and resources.  Voters, not judges, would be the 
ultimate critics of prosecutors’ priorities.194  The New Orleans experi-
ence confirms that prosecutors’ policies can become viable campaign 
issues, giving voters a clear choice. 
D. Personnel Actions:  Hiring, Firing, Promotion, Training 
Another institutional factor that has received almost no discussion 
in this context is personnel policy.  Recruiting, hiring, training, retain-
ing, and promoting the right people matter greatly, and successful or-
ganizations devote much thought and effort to these tasks.195  If one 
hires tough, independent people, for example, a firm will develop a 
tough, independent culture.196  This culture may be a mixed blessing; 
employees may be very self-directed but resistant to management and 
FEDERAL POLICY AND PRACTICE 7-8, 24 exhibit 2, 25 exhibit 3 (1998) (finding, in a mail 
survey, that 44.4% of districts reported that they consistently followed their policies, 
while 33.3% showed no consistency). 
193 See CARTER, supra note 173, at 119-23 (describing widespread noncompliance 
with a 150-page office manual in one county, in part because many policies were un-
clear, in part because the manual did not address many substantive questions, and in 
part because superiors did very little to detect and penalize violations). 
194 See Misner, supra note 159, at 767-69 (recommending that prosecutors create a 
detailed local plan outlining their enforcement strategy, thus empowering voters to 
review and compare the prosecutorial strategies of the competing candidates). 
195 See WELCH, supra note 155, at 383 (“Getting the right people in the right jobs is 
a lot more important than developing a strategy.”). 
196 SCHEIN, supra note 143, at 235. 
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coordination.  Replacing old managers with new ones from the 
healthiest, most successful units assists in changing cultures.197  Em-
pirical management literature emphasizes the need to hire and train 
employees who will embody and embrace the desired culture.198
The same steps work in prosecutors’ offices.  Some prosecutors’ 
offices do nothing systematic to recruit, hire, or train particular kinds 
of talents.199  Other offices, however, succeed in doing so.  New district 
attorneys may consciously select assistants with particular traits in or-
der to achieve certain goals.  Some seek out aggressive assistants and 
move away from part-time prosecutors.200  Others make a point of hir-
ing younger, more malleable assistants who are amenable to being 
trained and following office policy.201  A district attorney who plans to 
delegate much power may hire independent-minded assistants who 
197 See KOTTER & HESKETT, supra note 138, at 99 (reporting the importance of re-
placing managers and changing selection criteria in ten case studies of successful cul-
tural change). 
198 The empirical management and organizational literature on person-
organization fit is vast.  See, e.g., Geoffrey N. Abbott et al., Linking Values and Organiza-
tional Commitment:  A Correlational and Experimental Investigation in Two Organizations, 78 
J. OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 531, 545, 549 (2005) (noting that em-
ployees whose values align with their employer’s perceived values feel a greater com-
mitment to the organization, which is particularly likely if the organization is courte-
ous, cooperative, creative, and open); David E. Bowen et al., Hiring for the Organization, 
Not the Job, 5 ACAD. MGMT. EXECUTIVE 35, 36, 45-46 (1991) (emphasizing the impor-
tance of hiring the right employees and the benefits of hiring employees who fit the 
characteristics of a particular organization, which include better employee attitudes, 
performance, and organizational culture); Min-Ping Huang et al., Fitting in Organiza-
tional Values:  The Mediating Role of Person-Organization Fit Between CEO Charismatic Lead-
ership and Employee Outcomes, 26 INT’L J. MANPOWER 35, 44-46 (2005) (finding that both 
charismatic leadership and “person-organization values fit” improve work effort, satis-
faction with leaders, and organizational commitment); Charles A. O’Reilly III et al., 
People and Organizational Culture:  A Profile Comparison Approach to Assessing Person-
Organization Fit, 34 ACAD. MGMT. J. 487, 509-12 (1991) (reporting that person-
organization fit is associated with job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job 
turnover); Charles D. Stevens & Ronald A. Ash, Selecting Employees for Fit:  Personality and 
Preferred Managerial Style, 13 J. MANAGERIAL ISSUES 500, 510-11 (2001) (showing that an 
employee’s agreeableness and openness to experience correlate with his amenability to 
participatory management). 
199 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 173, at 135-38 (describing in detail a district attor-
ney’s office which had no real training program and little clear hiring criteria apart 
from winnowing out bearded and physically repulsive candidates). 
200 See, e.g., Flemming, supra note 114, at 29 (describing a prosecutor who “swept 
out the part-time staff [and] handpicked new, aggressive assistants with crusader-like 
attitudes”).
201 See, e.g., id. at 43 (describing an office that altered its hiring practices to target 
newly minted attorneys instead of the skilled and experienced attorneys that it had tar-
geted in the past). 
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share his outlook.202  District attorneys may install trusted confidantes 
as supervisors, strengthening their ability to implement central pol-
icy.203  Or they may pick experienced trial attorneys with the credibility 
to evaluate cases and make plea-bargaining policies stick.204  Getting 
rid of opposition is also important.  One new district attorney laid 
down the law by firing an assistant on the spot for violating a rule 
against plea bargaining in drug cases.205  This move sent a clear mes-
sage that he was serious about changing business as usual.  Other old-
timers leave of their own accord when a new administration vigorously 
implements new priorities and rules.206
District attorneys can use these tools to promote other values as 
well.  If prosecutors suffer from an excess of adversarial zeal and a 
notches-on-the-belt conviction mentality, personnel decisions could 
change that.  Hiring could weed out prosecutors who believe that all 
defendants are guilty and defense lawyers wear black hats.  For exam-
ple, prosecutors’ offices could require a minimum level of criminal-
defense experience for new prosecutors.  If an across-the-board re-
quirement is too broad, then district attorneys could require half or 
two-thirds of their new hires to have this experience.  They could also 
require criminal defense experience for certain supervisors.207  Doing 
so might transform the office culture from a battle of good versus evil 
into a more balanced view of the search for truth.  Training exercises 
could reinforce this message, underscoring common causes of wrong-
ful convictions and appropriate criteria for leniency. 
Likewise, prosecutors may eventually become wedded to convict-
ing defendants and less careful about presuming innocence and ques-
202 See, e.g., id. at 45 (depicting a prosecutor who recruited attorneys who shared 
his “conservative philosophy” and let them work without extensive oversight). 
203 See, e.g., id. at 38 (noting that district attorneys often chose close friends as their 
deputies because of their loyalty). 
204 See, e.g., Wright & Miller, supra note 15, at 62-63 (highlighting the New Orleans 
District Attorney’s Office, which gave experienced attorneys responsibility for screen-
ing and evaluating cases). 
205 See Flemming, supra note 114, at 42-43. 
206 See, e.g., id. at 43 (pointing to a mass exodus in the wake of an administrative 
change).
207 At least one prominent federal prosecutor’s office already has such a require-
ment. See Ellen Yaroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors:  Experiences of Truth Tell-
ing and Embellishment, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 964 (1999) (reporting that the chief of 
the criminal division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of New 
York must have experience as a defense lawyer). 
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tioning evidence of guilt.208  They may develop a black-and-white view 
of the world and fail to see shades of gray.209  In addition, empirical 
evidence shows that veteran prosecutors resist changes in office policy.  
They see themselves outlasting the current head prosecutor, they 
think they know what is best for the office, and they are less eager to 
invest extra work.210  Over the last three decades, careerism has grown 
into a problem, at least at the federal level.211  A radical solution would 
be Great Britain’s, which requires barristers to alternate prosecuting 
and defending cases and so prevents prosecutors from developing a 
conviction mentality and careerist mindset.212  Less radical measures 
might also work.  For example, one could require prosecutors to 
spend a month each year defending criminal cases so that they learn 
to see things from the other side’s perspective.213  Another possibility is 
208 See George T. Felkenes, The Prosecutor:  A Look at Reality, 7 SW. U. L. REV. 98, 110-
19 (1975) (reporting empirical evidence that many prosecutors, particularly more ex-
perienced prosecutors, manifest “conviction psychology” and presume guilt, and that 
this psychology “may cause the prosecutor to ignore his quasi-judicial role”); Fisher, su-
pra, note 173, at 206 (noting that “conviction psychology” is a more powerful force than 
the pressure to be fair); Melilli, supra note 173, at 690 (noting that “conviction psychol-
ogy” makes it more difficult for prosecutors to protect innocent defendants). 
209 See Yaroshefsky, supra note 207, at 964 n.234 (quoting one former federal 
prosecutor as stating, “Career prosecutors are inevitably cynical about the human 
race. . . . Someone who has been a defense lawyer gets to see the person and is aware 
of the complexities and motivations, the ambiguities of acts and sees things from a dif-
ferent tactical perspective.”). 
210 See, e.g., Todd Lochner, Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in 
United States Attorneys’ Offices:  The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants, 23 JUST. SYS.
J. 271, 282, 285-88 (2002) (finding an overall increase in the number of prosecutors 
who choose to work in a U.S. Attorney’s Office as a career, and noting that career 
prosecutors are less motivated, take “easier” cases, and often resist changes within the 
prosecutor’s office). 
211 See id. at 281-83 (noting that the median tenure of Assistant U.S. Attorneys has 
increased from three to eight years and that the annual turnover rate has dropped 
from six to two percent, and describing careerism as “[t]he number-one problem fac-
ing the federal prosecutorial system today inasmuch as this careerism made it more 
difficult for U.S. attorneys or the [D]epartment [of Justice] to set prosecutorial agen-
das”).  It is not clear whether this problem exists at the state level, as salaries and bene-
fits are not as generous there.  Federal civil-service protections also contribute to the 
problem.  See id. at 283-84. 
212 See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 456 
(1992); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 67 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 403, 446-47 (1992). 
213 See Gershman, supra note 212, at 457-58 (suggesting that prosecutors and public 
defenders swap places for one year).  Because conflicts of interest might pose a problem, 
these temporary defenders would, ideally, defend cases in a nearby jurisdiction or at a 
different level (state or federal).  Failing that, perhaps ethics rules could allow them to 
defend crimes of a sort different from those handled by their departments. 
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term limits for line prosecutors, requiring that after six years in office, 
prosecutors rotate out into a criminal defense job for a while before 
being eligible to rotate back into the prosecutor’s office.  Offering no 
or scanty retirement plans and capping raises for seniority would rein-
force pressures to rotate out after four or five years.214  This rotation in 
office, so valued by the founding generation,215 would prevent one-
sided institutional attitudes and careerist incentives from hardening. 
E.  Information, Evaluations, and Incentives 
Information matters not only to voters, as Section II.A suggested, 
but also to leaders and managers.  Successful, effective firms help in-
formation to flow up, down, and sideways throughout the organiza-
tion.  Leaders must be able to learn from their subordinates’ knowl-
edge and perspective and to communicate priorities and policies to 
them.  To do this, successful leaders regularly listen to and speak with 
subordinates and eliminate filters that block information.216  Managers 
should discuss and sell proposed changes throughout the organiza-
tion, which engenders feedback and forces them to respond to knowl-
edgeable criticism.217  Anonymous internet surveys elicit candid re-
sponses from employees, forcing management to improve its own 
performance and initiatives.218  Even the physical layout of an office 
can promote or hinder information flow.  Open office layouts, glass 
doors, kitchens, and eating areas foster informal communication.219
214 See EDWARD E. LAWLER III, STRATEGIC PAY 207 (1990) (noting that entrepre-
neurial organizations put much of their compensation at risk with programs such as 
pay-for-performance schemes, and that Apple Computer has no retirement plan be-
cause it does not want to attract security-oriented employees). 
215 Cf. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1189 
(1991) (finding that mandatory rotation is central to an effective jury system and that 
some of the Founding Fathers also supported mandatory rotation for legislators). 
216 See, e.g., LOWE, supra note 170, at 83-86 (describing the system of open com-
munication and information flow at General Electric). 
217 See, e.g., SLOAN, supra note 155, at 433-34 (describing the advantages of the 
General Motors system, which requires division managers to sell new ideas to central 
management).
218 See, e.g., WELCH, supra note 155, at 393-94 (describing anonymous online sur-
veys at General Electric). 
219 See, e.g., SCHEIN, supra note 143, at 240-41 (contrasting two different office lay-
outs that foster communication and privacy, respectively, and noting that layouts often 
reveal how leaders manage relationships, acquire information, and carry out tasks); 
Robert J. Grossman, Offices vs. Open Space, HR MAG., Sept. 2002, at 36, 38 (reporting 
that each of CommonHealth’s buildings has an atrium with a kitchen, bistro-style cafe-
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Many prosecutors’ offices violate these principles.  Some lack 
feedback loops, so line prosecutors who err at an early stage of a case 
may never see their errors come to fruition later in the case, under 
another prosecutor.220  Others are stuck with antiquated computers 
that hinder tracking cases and case-processing statistics.  Thus, for ex-
ample, prosecutors may not be aware of how their colleagues are us-
ing and rewarding cooperating witnesses.221  Some supervisors are un-
sociable and insular and make little effort to listen to and learn from 
colleagues and adversaries.222  Prosecutors are sometimes scattered 
across various offices or buildings and may lack water coolers or cafés 
where they can congregate and talk.223
Good information helps managers to formulate and critique poli-
cies.  As noted earlier, it helps them to communicate and document 
the need for change.224  It creates benchmarks that facilitate consis-
tency and equality, creating focal points for decisions in keeping with 
colleagues’ past decisions.  For example, data may guide and harmo-
nize prosecutors’ decisions about declinations, cooperators, plea bar-
gains, and the like.  Prosecutors guided by data and benchmarks may 
be less likely to fall back on race and class biases.  Computerized data 
collection and analysis can measure patterns of race-neutral case 
processing and disparities due to the quality of defense lawyering.  
Head prosecutors and outsiders are better able to review systemic pat-
terns than individual decisions.  Making this data available to head 
teria, coffee bar, or similar area to encourage workers to congregate, interact infor-
mally, and generate ideas collaboratively). 
220 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 173, at 129-30. 
221 See Melanie D. Wilson, Prosecutors “Doing Justice” Through Osmosis—Reminders to 
Encourage a Culture of Cooperation, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 67, 106 (2008) (noting an “in-
excusable . . . dearth of information, communication and conversation” about how to 
use cooperating witnesses effectively within the U.S. Department of Justice). 
222 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 173, at 49-56 (describing the conduct of a “formal-
ist” manager who struggles to build social relationships with fellow attorneys and to 
address the human aspects of working as a prosecutor). 
223 See, e.g., NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 148, at 142-43 (describing the difficulty of 
collecting and distributing information in a decentralized court community where line 
prosecutors and head prosecutors have separate office areas); cf. CARTER, supra note 
173, at 53 (discussing the importance of lunchtime conversations about office prob-
lems and how a supervisor who regularly ate lunch at his desk isolated himself from 
this source of information). 
224 See sources cited supra note 151 and accompanying text (discussing how effec-
tive managers marshal data to demonstrate the need for reforms). 
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prosecutors, legislatures, litigants, and voters can create feedback 
loops and new metrics for prosecutorial success.225
Information also illumines personnel decisions.  Frequent per-
formance evaluations and appraisals help to reward, retain, and edu-
cate top performers.  Identifying and culling the weakest performers, 
as well as those who resist the desired office culture, improves per-
formance.  General Electric goes so far as to fire the bottom ten per-
cent of its employees each year, in an effort to keep improving its 
workforce.226  For this system to work well, the organization must de-
velop a culture that prizes openness and candid feedback.227  If an of-
fice is unable or unwilling to fire its bottom performers, perhaps be-
cause of civil-service protections, it should pay them poorly so that 
they leave on their own.228
I have already discussed how performance evaluations by other 
prosecutors, defense counsel, judges, victims, and jurors could disci-
pline head prosecutors.229  The same tools could effectively influence 
line prosecutors.  First, performance evaluations would educate 
prosecutors, creating a valuable feedback loop that could be coupled 
with training exercises to improve deficiencies.  Second, they would 
reward the best prosecutors, increasing their incentives to stay and to 
invest in their work.  Third, they would help to improve the quality of 
prosecutors, weeding out those whose skills, ethics, or diligence are 
questionable. 
Incentive-pay systems are an important tool for rewarding and en-
couraging performance in the corporate world.230  The same idea 
225 See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, The Black Box, 94 IOWA L. REV. 125, 181-
91 (2008) (noting that information technology can greatly improve both internal 
transparency—information-sharing within prosecutors’ offices—and external trans-
parency—opening prosecutorial performance to scrutiny and criticism by litigants and 
legislatures). 
226 See WELCH, supra note 155, at 158-67, 387-88 (“From my first days, I thought 
[ranking] was the key to building a great organization. . . . We used it relentlessly to 
push leaders to continually upgrade their teams.  Year after year, forcing managers to 
weed out their worst performers was the best antidote for bureaucracy.”); see also id. at 
389 (asserting the importance of firing employees who resisted the new company’s cul-
ture after a merger). 
227 See id. at 162 (“Our [ranking system] works because we spent over a decade 
building a performance culture with candid feedback at every level.”). 
228 See LAWLER, supra note 214, at 25 (describing poor performers’ dissatisfaction 
with pay as a desirable catalyst of turnover). 
229 See supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. 
230 See, e.g., SLOAN, supra note 155, at 407-28 (discussing the details of the General 
Motors bonus plan); WELCH, supra note 155, at 159-60 (discussing how General Elec-
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might work for prosecutors.  Tracey Meares has proposed combating 
prosecutorial overcharging by financially rewarding prosecutors whose 
initial charges closely match the charges of conviction.231  She also 
proposes financial incentives to penalize prosecutors who engage in 
misconduct at trial.232  While the idea is promising in theory, it is 
probably unworkable in practice.  Sizable monetary rewards for par-
ticular statistics could lead prosecutors to undercharge rather than 
overcharge and to plea bargain to avoid losing rewards for ethical 
misconduct.233  These difficulties exemplify a broader problem with 
many incentive-pay schemes.  Reward systems tend to overemphasize 
and breed objective, quantifiable, highly visible successes at the ex-
pense of other important values.234  When head prosecutors set per-
formance goals, they tend to emphasize quantitative statistics that are 
manipulable and inflatable, such as conviction statistics.235
Performance evaluations by fellow prosecutors, defense counsel, 
defendants, judges, jurors, and victims might be a sturdier foundation 
for an incentive-pay system.  The beauty of performance evaluations is 
that they can aggregate feedback that is scattered in the minds of 
hundreds of observers.  This quantitative and qualitative collective 
evaluation would be far more subtle, reliable, and resistant to manipu-
lation than a single statistic.  Peer groups, for example, have better 
collective information and better collective judgment than individual 
tric’s reward system of raises, stock options, and promotions aids retention of top per-
formers and encourages average performers to improve). 
231 See Meares, supra note 79, at 873-75 (predicting that such a charging practice 
would ensure that prosecutors proceed only with the offenses that they are likely to be 
able to prove at trial). 
232 See id. at 901-02 (positing that a system that “ties financial rewards to the stan-
dards of [ethical] conduct” will both discipline prosecutors and make their supervisors 
more aware of improper behavior). 
233 Cf. id. at 884-87, 916-17 (noting the danger that prosecutors could undercharge 
to earn rewards but suggesting that other mechanisms could counteract these dangers 
and that financial rewards could nevertheless work). 
234 See Steven Kerr, On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B, 18 ACAD. MGMT.
J. 769, 775 (1975) (citing sports and business examples of coaches or managers who 
reward quantifiable achievements but neglect to reward intangibles); see also WELCH,
supra note 155, at 387 (describing a General Electric sales contest that produced enor-
mous sales but no profit margin:  “That’s the simplest example of a universal problem:  
What you measure is what you get—what you reward is what you get”). 
235 Cf. MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY 167, 233 n.10 (1980) (noting 
that when incentive pay rewarded Washington, D.C., police officers for reducing 
crime, officers manipulated statistics by misreporting burglaries as larcenies or under-
reporting the dollar values involved). 
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supervisors alone.236  Peer evaluations can improve performance over 
time and can gradually articulate criteria of success more subtle than 
those laid down in rules from on high.237  Computers could help to 
track, recognize, and reward top performers.  One would still have to 
figure out how to weight each constituency’s appraisal and how much 
to reward.  Experimentation would be necessary.  Nevertheless, an-
nual bonuses based on these evaluations are far preferable to raises 
based simply on seniority or manipulable conviction statistics.238  Pub-
licized, positive recognition for individuals and groups of prosecutors 
who perform well would underscore the message.239
CONCLUSION
Though prosecutors share many of the community’s values, they 
face strong temptations to shirk, indulge risk aversion, and be selec-
tively lenient.  These hidden, poorly supervised individual decisions 
may result in patterns that look arbitrary, discriminatory, or skewed 
toward clients of highly paid, well-connected defense counsel.  Some 
prosecutorial discretion is necessary and desirable, but it need not be 
so self-interested and unstructured. 
236 See LAWLER, supra note 214, at 80-81 (suggesting that peer-awarded bonus 
schemes are promising and noting that Xerox and Wells Fargo, for example, let em-
ployees give other employees twenty-five or thirty-five dollar awards for excellence or 
helpfulness). 
237 See Peter A. Bamberger et al., Peer Assessment, Individual Performance, and Contri-
bution to Group Processes:  The Impact of Rater Anonymity, 30 GROUP & ORG. MGMT. 344, 
365, 367-68 (2005) (reporting empirical evidence that peer evaluation, particularly 
nonanonymous peer evaluation, improved managers’ ratings of subordinates’ per-
formance and attitudes); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving” for Everyone (and 
Everything?), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699 (2006) (discussing how decentralized peer evalua-
tions can develop norms over time, resulting in assessments that are more subtle, con-
textualized, and accurate than what police can achieve with spot checks for compliance 
with a handful of clear rules). 
238 See LAWLER, supra note 214, at 82-83 (explaining that bonuses reward and en-
courage current performance, while base-pay raises may reward past performers even if 
they are no longer performing well). 
239 See id. at 84 (noting the importance of evaluating group and team performance 
and giving special awards for exceptional individual performance); id. at 125 (noting 
the symbolic and communicative benefits of paying everyone for the performance of 
the organization as a whole); JAMES W. FAIRFIELD-SONN, CORPORATE CULTURE AND THE 
QUALITY ORGANIZATION 155-56 (2001) (reporting that quality organizations tend to 
focus on building and rewarding successful cultures by rewarding customer service that 
achieves long-term goals, rewarding group efforts, and using public, positive recogni-
tion to spur continual improvement). 
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Conventional external regulation has failed to guide prosecutors.  
It cannot work well because outsiders lack the information, capacity, 
and day-to-day oversight to structure patterns of decisions.  Ex ante 
rules cannot forecast all possible cases, and ex post case-by-case review 
is too ad hoc to see the forest for the trees.  Rather, prosecutors’ of-
fices could learn from corporations.  Victims, defendants, and the 
public could better discipline head prosecutors if they had more in-
formation and participation.  Head prosecutors could then use more 
internal tools to regulate line prosecutors.  Accountability and institu-
tional design, in short, are more promising reforms than external 
regulation. 
I do not mean to suggest that prosecutors’ offices are exactly 
analogous to corporations.  Prosecutors’ offices have broader duties to 
do justice, which includes freeing the innocent and showing mercy to 
sympathetic guilty defendants.  They also operate under rules that re-
duce flexibility, such as civil-service statutes, as well as political patron-
age pressures.  Corporations strive primarily to maximize profits.  Yet 
successful corporations recognize duties to broader stakeholder con-
stituencies, and their cultures prize integrity and ethical conduct.  
Emulating these corporations might reinforce prosecutors’ sense of 
mission to do justice. 
The broader lesson is that criminal procedure should focus less 
on precise statutory and judicial standards and more on institutional 
design.  Telling a prosecutor to behave ethically and consistently is far 
less fruitful than creating an environment that expects, monitors, and 
rewards ethical, consistent behavior. 
